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1. INTRODUCTION

Whistleblower advocates generally cheered Barack Obama's
election in 2008 because they had a "longtime friend" ascending to
the Presidency.l Before entering public service, Obama represented a
qui tam whistle blower as an attorney, and then, as both a state senator and a U.S. senator, Obama supported whistleblower protection
2
legislation. As a candidate for President, Obama reiterated his support for expanded whistleblower protections. 3 Most importantly, as
President-Elect, Obama promised to reinvigorate ethics in government, and part of his plan included increased protections for whistleblowers. Before he took office, the Obama-Biden transition team
stated,
[0 ]ften the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse
in government is an existing government employee committed to
public integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of courage and
patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer
dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifled. We need to empower federal employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners
in performance. Barack Obama will strengthen whistleblower laws

1. Joe Davidson, Joe Davidson's Federal Diary: Whistleblowers May Have Friend in Oval
Office, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2008, at D3; see also TOM DEVINE & T AREK F. MAASSARANI,
THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER'S SURVIVAL GUIDE 183 (2011) ("The Obama Administration's arrival brought high expectations that times are, indeed, a-changin'."); Megan Chuchmach
& Rhonda Schwartz, Will Obama Keep His Promise to Federal Whistieblowers?, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 4, 20(9), <http://abcnews.go.comlBlotterlstory?id=8241580&page=1>.
2. Chuchmach & Schwartz, supra note 1; Davidson, supra note 1.
3. Letter from Barack Obama to The National Academies (Oct. 9, 20(8), available at
<obama.3cdn.netl08fe869a2e4de42afl_zam6b5vn2.pdf> ("I will strengthen protections for
'whistlebJowers' who report on any government attempts to distort or ignore scientific research.").
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to protect federal workers who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of
authority in government. Obama will ensure that federal agencies
expedite the process for reviewing whistleblower claims
and whis4
tleblowers have full access to courts and due process.

In many ways, President Obama has lived up to his promised
support for whistleblowers. Obama's appointments to key administrative positions in charge of whistleblower protection consistently supported employee rights and worked steadily to unravel the longstanding anti-whistleblower bias in those agencies. s Moreover, the
three most prominent pieces of Obama's legislative agenda - the economic stimulus package, the financial reform bill, and health care reform - all included key provisions that enhanced whistle blower protections. 6
However, the Obama Administration's record regarding whistleblower protection for national security whistleblowers has been decidedly less emphatic and more nuanced. 7 Indeed, the Obama Administration has been accused of conducting a "war on whistleblowers,"
because of its aggressive prosecution of leaks related to national security.8 Obama's Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted six people
who allegedly disclosed sensitive information to non-governmental
entities (such as the media) under the Espionage Act, a statute typically used to prosecute disclosure of national secrets to foreign governments - more such prosecutions than all previous administrations
combined. 9 Moreover, Obama's Administration has continued the

4. Agenda' Ethics, CHANGE.GOV <http://change.gov/agenda/ethics_agendal> (last visited
Apr. 16,2012).
5. See discussion infra Part ILA.l.
6. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
7. See Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, THE NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 47, 48 (asserting that President Obama has drawn a "sharp distinction between whistle-blowers who exclusively reveal wrongdoing and those who jeopardize national security").
8. Glenn Greenwald, The DOl's Creeping War on Whistle-Blowers, SALON (Feb. 25, 2011,
7:26 AM CDT), <http://www.salon.comJ2011/02/25/whistleblowers_4/>; Scott Horton, Obama's
War on Whistleblowers, HARPER'S MAGAZINE (Aug. 31, 2010, 1:33 PM), <http://www.
harpers.org/archive/2010/08/hbc-90007562>; see also Conor Friedersdorf, The Obama Adminiso'ation's Whistleblower Problem, THE ATLANTIC (June 30, 2011, 7:10 AM ET) <http://www.
theatlan tic.com/poli tics/archi ve/2011/06/the-o bama -Administrations-whistleblower-problem/
2412621> (noting that the Obama Administration, "for reasons big and small, fair and possibly
unfair, ... has acquired a reputation for retaliating against whistieblowers"); Josh Gerstein, Juslice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, POLITICO (May 25, 2010, 4:44 AM EDT) <http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/051O/3772l.htmi> ("President Barack Obama's Justice Department
has taken a hard line against leakers, and Obama himself has expressed anger about disclosures
of national security deliberations in the press.").
9. Charlie Savage, Ex-C.l.A. Officer Charged in Information Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2012, at AI; Scott Shane, U.S. Pressing lIs Crackdown Against Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2011, at A1; discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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Bush Administration's attempts to coerce reporters into identifying
the sources of national security leaks. lO Further, his support for statutory improvements to antiretaliation laws varies depending on whether the proposed protection affects whistle blowers in the intelligence
•
11
commumty.
This Article explores President Obama's seemingly contradictory
approach to whistle blowers and the distinction he appears to draw between whistleblowing about governmental misconduct generally,
which he supports, and whistleblowing in the national security context, which he appears to disdain. Part II of the Article describes the
numerous moves Obama made to improve whistle blower protection
through his Presidential appointments and his support of improved
antiretaliation statutory measures. Additionally, this Part contrasts
that support with Obama's seemingly antagonistic approach to whistleblowing about national security.
At least two questions arise from drawing this distinction between national security whistleblowing and other types of whistleblowing. First, where does the distinction come from? Second, does
the distinction make sense?
Part III answers the first question by examining why Obama
might approach national security whistle blowing differently than other types of whistleblowing. In some respects, this different approach
continues a long-standing separation of powers dispute between the
legislative and the executive branches of the federal government.
Congress desires transparency and oversight of the executive branch,
which it hopes to achieve by encouraging executive branch employees
to disclose information to Congress. Presidents traditionally have resisted these efforts, particularly when they involve matters over which
the Constitution arguably has empowered the President with exclusive domain, such as protecting secrecy related to national security.
The state of the law related to national security whistleblowers reflects this dispute in that such whistleblowers generally receive far
fewer protections than other types of whistle blowers. In short, President Obama values secrecy over transparency and oversight when it
comes to national security whistleblowing, and the law often reflects
and supports this choice.
Part IV responds to the second question - does this distinction
make sense? - by analyzing whether President Obama and the cur10. See discussion infi-a Part rI.B.2.
11. See id.
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rent state of the law correctly balance the competing goals of secrecy
and security on the one hand and transparency and oversight on the
other. Although reasons certainly exist to treat national security whistleblowers differently than other whistle blowers, I argue in this Part
that the law could be modified to increase transparency and oversight
without a corresponding negative impact on secrecy and national security. I conclude the Article with several suggestions to re-balance
the scales and to provide national security employees appropriate encouragement to blow the whistle on governmental misconduct.
II. OBAMA'S NUANCED ApPROACH TO WHISTLEBLOWING
Every government has an interest in concealment; every public, in
greater access to information. In this perennial conflict, the risks of
secrecy affect even those administrators least disposed at the outset
to exploit it. How many leaders have not come into office determined to work for more open government, only to end by fretting
over leaks ....
Sissela Bok (1982/ 2

A. Obama's Support for Whistleblowers Generally

In several important respects, President Obama has supported
whistleblowers as he promised during the campaign.
1. Presidential Appointments
First, President Obama appointed supporters of whistleblower
rights to key administrative positions involved in protecting whistleblowers.13 At least one whistleblower advocate felt that Obama's appointments were "a weathervane that the Obama Administration is
serious about its good government rhetoric.,,14 This same advocate asserted that the President appointed "the strongest, most qualified
team in history to protect government and corporate whistleblowers. ,,15

12. SrSSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 177
(1982).

13. Whistleblower advocacy groups greeted these nominations with acclaim, likely indicating the extent to which these appointments support whistleblowers generally. See, e.g., Press
Release, Gov't Accountability Project, GAP Executive Director to Become Deputy Special
Counsel (June 15, 2011), available at <http://www.whistleblower.orglpress/press-release-archive/
1195-gap-executive-director-to-become-deputy-special-counsel> ("The Obama Administration
has appointed a very strong team to lead the agencies that implement whistleblower laws.").
14. Chuchmach & Schwartz, supra note 1 (quoting Tom Devine of GAP).
15. See Tom Devine, GAP Praises Confirmation of New Special Counsel Lerner, Gov'T
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a. Merit Systems Protection Board
For example, in 2009, Obama appointed Susan Tsui Grundmann
as Chairman of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and
Anne Marie Wagner as Vice Chairman. The MSPB hears appeals
from administrative judges of complaints by federal employees, including whistleblowers, related to the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 (CSRA) and the amendments to that act in the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 (WPA).16 Grundmann was the general counsel
for the National Federation of Federal Employees, and Wagner had
been the general counsel for the Personal Appeals Board of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office.17 These appointments in particular signaled hope for whistleblowers because the MSPB under President Bush's nominees routinely ruled against whistleblowers: by one
count the Bush MSPB found for a whistle blower in only one out of
forty-five cases. IS
Although it may still be early to completely assess the effect of
these nominations, some moves by the new MSPB indicate a reversal
of the old Board's harsh stance towards whistleblowers. By January
2011, one year into the new Board's tenure, whistle blowers had won
half (four of eight) of the cases brought to the full MSPB. 19 One of the
most visible of those cases, involving Washington D.C. Park Police
Chief Theresa Chambers, highlights the Board's new approach under
Obama's nominees. The Department of Interior had fired Chambers
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Apr. 15,2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1068gap-praises-confirmation-of-new-special-counsel-Ierner>.
16. See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTEcnON BD., <http://mspb.gov/About/about
.htm> (last visited Apr. 16,2012). The CSRA, as amended by the WPA, provides retaliation
protection to certain federal employees who report specific types of misconduct within the executive branches of the federal government.
17. Chuchmach & Schwartz, supra note 1.
18. Id. ("Unlike Bush Administration appointees who compiled a 1-44 track record against
whistleblowers, these leaders are seasoned veterans with a proven track record of commitment
to the merit system throughout their careers." (quoting Tom Devine from GAP)). The MSPB's
miserable track record for whistleblowers actually goes further back than President G.W. Bush;
Tom Devine testified to Congress that in 2,000 cases between 1979 and 1988, the Board ruled
for whistle blowers four times on the merits. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and
Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 11lth Congo 11 (2009) (statement of Thomas
Devine, Government Accountability Project) [hereinafter Devine Statement], available at
<http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090513183928.pdf>. Since
2000, whistleblowers have won three out of 56 cases. See id.
19. Tom Devine, MSPB Turnaround Highlights Problems with Administrative Judge System, GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Feb. 1,2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/312010/971-mspb-turnaround-highlights-problems-with-administrative-judge-system>. Tom Devine
stated that "[fJor whistleblowers, to date the [new] Board's leadership has been turning on the
lights after the Dark Ages." Id.
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for disclosing that cutbacks in the Park Police budget resulted in increased public safety problems. 20 After previous Boards and the Federal Circuit earlier rejected Chambers' claims, the Obama MSPB
overturned these decisions, restored her to her previous position, and
awarded her backpay.21 In another early case under the new Board,
the MSPB found that the WPA protected whistle blower disclosures
even if the disclosures violated an agency policy of confidentiality.22
Also, in 2011, the Board issued favorable rulings for whistleblowers,
or vacated and remanded administrative judge decisions against whistleblowers, in at least seven cases - an extraordinary number given its
.
previOus
recor d .23
In addition to issuing favorable rulings, Obama's MSPB appointees also signaled their understanding that whistleblower protection
remains an important aspect of the Board's responsibility. For example, in December 2010, the Board released a detailed report on the
status of federal employee whistle blower protections and the "diffi24
culties" a whistleblower must overcome to receive protection. Although the Board carefully did not take a position on whether the law
should be changed,25 the Board paved the way for legislative reform
26
by highlighting the deficiencies in the current legal regime. The
See Chambers v. Dep't of Interior, 2011 M.S.P.B. 7 'Il'll 3-6 (2011).
See id. 'll'lI 49-50.
See Parikh v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 2011 M.S.P.B. 1 'Il'll18-19 (2011).
See King v. Dep't of Army, 2011 M.S.P.B. 83 'Il'll5-7 (2011) (finding that the WPA protects employees whose agencies perceive them to be whistle blowers, even if the employee never
20.
21.
22.
23.

actually blew the whistle; and finding that the AU should have told the employee about the
possibility of making a claim as a perceived whistleblower); Ingram v. Dep't of Army, 2011
M.S.P.B. 71 'Il'll 4-6 (2011) (finding that employee had engaged in protected conduct when he
objected to a department event the employee claimed would have violated ethical regulations
and potentially reveal trade secrets of agency contractors); Usharauli v. Dep't Health & Human
Servs., 2011 M.S.P.B. 54 'Il'll 6-8 (2011) (finding that refusing to reappoint an employee and placing the employee on administrative leave are "personnel actions" under 5 U.S.c. §
2302(a)(2)(A) (2006) that could form the basis for a retaliation claim); Vaughn v. Dep't of Agriculture, 2011 M.S.P.B. 48 'Il'll5-7 (2011) (overturning an AU and finding that an agency had not
fully complied with the Board's previous order in favor of a whistleblower); Peterson v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 2011 M.S.P.B. 38 'll'll 3-11 (2011) (finding that an AU improperly dismissed a
whistleblower's claim at the pleading stage); Mason v. Dep't Homeland Sec., 2011 M.S.P.B. 39
'll'll 8-12 (2011) (vacating and remanding whistleblower case because the AU should have concluded that an employee engaged in protected conduct); Hamilton v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
2011 M.S.P.B. 35 'll'lI 14-15 (2011) (vacating and remanding case because AU should have found
that whistleblowing played a contributing factor in the employee's removal).
24. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES, at unnumbered 2 (2010), available at <http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.
aspx?docnumber=557972%20&version=559604&application=ACROBAT>.
25. See id. at 2.
26. See id. at unnumbered 2 ("This report spells out in greater depth the difficulties a potential whistleblower may face when navigating the law to seek protection from agency retaliation.").
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Board also surveyed federal employees generally on their perceptions
of various prohibited personnel practices, including whistleblowing,27
and, most recently, released the results of a study examining whistleblowing in more detail, including how to encourage more employees
to report misconduct. 28 At a minimum, then, the Obama MSPB appointees have taken their call to protect whistleblowers seriously and
indicated that whistleblowers might actually have success through the
administrative process set up by the CSRA and the WP A - propositions that many whistleblowers would have found hard to believe during previous administrations. 29
b. Office of Special Counsel
Obama's appointments to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
provide more examples. The OSC exists to protect federal government whistleblowers and to investigate their disclosures. 3o During the
Bush presidency, the OSC did little to fulfill these roles, leading some
whistleblower advocates to call it "dysfunctional.,,31 OSC employees
filed a formal complaint against Bush's Special Counsel, Scott Bloch,
for issuing a gag order prohibiting employees from talking to anyone
outside OSC about sensitive internal matters without prior clearance
- an order that likely violated the First Amendment and federal law
32
permitting employees to give information to Congress. He also
summarily dismissed hundreds of whistleblower cases in order to
clear a backlog of pending matters. 33 Adding insult to injury, Bloch
later resigned in disgrace amid charges that he had retaliated against

27. See generally MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES:
EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS 32-33 (2011), available at <http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.
aspx?docnumber=634680&version=636592&application=ACROBAT>.
28. See generally MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES MAKING DISCLOSURES (2011), available at <http://www.mspb.gov/net
search/viewdocs.aspx? docnumber=662503& version=6644 75&application=A CRO BAT>.
29. This is not to say that the administrative process for federal whistleblowers works well.
Tom Devine has argued that even though the MSPB has become more open to whistle blower
complaints, the ALJs who adjudicate an employee's initial hearing remain hostile to whistleblowers. See Devine, supra note 19.
30. See Introduction 10 OSC, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, <http://www.osc.gov
11ntro.htm> (last visited Apr. 16,2012).
31. PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY
WHlSTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 13 (2005); see also Joe Davidson,
Federal Diary: Whistleblowers Get a Defender, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,2011, at B4 ("OSC is an
independent federal agency with a long and well-deserved reputation for failing to protect federal whistleblowers. ").
32. See Peter Katel, Protecting Whistleblowers, 16 CQ RESEARCHER 265, 278 (2006).
33. See PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, supra note 31, at 13-14.
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whistleblowers in his own office. 34
In June 2011, after leaving the Special Counsel position vacant
for several years, Obama appointed as Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner, an experienced plaintiff's civil rights lawyer. 35 Lerner subsequently appointed Mark Cohen, the Executive Director of the Government
Accountability Project (GAP), a whistleblower advocacy group, to
become Deputy Special Counsel. The GAP President announced that
"[t]his is a time of celebration for whistleblowers everywhere....
[Cohen] is exactly the kind of whistle blower advocate who should be
working in the Office of Special Counsel. ,,36
Within months of their appointments, Lerner and Cohen immediately altered the direction of the OSC by asking the Merit Systems
Protection Board to prevent federal agencies from taking adverse
personnel actions against two alleged whistleblowers,37 an action the
MSPB granted less than a week later. 38 Lerner stated that the unprecedented actions "make clear that this agency will vigorously protect
federal employees against retaliation when they blow the whistle. ,,39
The National Whistleblowers Center remarked that the move "marks
the beginning of new assertiveness by the OSC, and new grounds for
optimism by federal employees at every level.,,4o Indeed, the Department of Defense ultimately reinstated the security clearance of one
whistleblower, allowing him to return to work. 41 This whistle blower,
34. See Joe Davidson, Workers Applaud Special Counsel's Return to Private Sector, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 200S, at B4; Robert Brodsky, White House Forces OSC Chief Out, GOY
EXEC.COM (Oct. 23, 200S), <http://www.govexec.com/oversight1200S/1O/white-house-forces-oscchief-out/279111> (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Bloch pled guilty to contempt of Congress after he
had his computer hard drive erased when Congress began to investigate those allegations. Davidson, supra note 31. Subsequently, he successfully withdrew his guilty plea because he claimed
he was not fully informed that his conviction would result in a mandatory jail sentence. Id.
35. See Carolyn Lerner, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, <http://www.osc.gov/Lerner.
htm> (last visited Apr. 16,2012).
36. Press Release, Gov't Accountability Project, GAP Executive Director to Become
Deputy Special Counsel (June 15,2011), available at <http://www.whistleblower.org/press/pressrelease-archive1201111195-gap-executive-director-to-become-deput y-special-counsel>.
37. Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, OSC Seeks Quick Action to Protect Two
Public Health and Safety Whistleblowers (Oct. S, 2011), available at <www.osc.gov/documents/
press/20111pr11_17du.pdf>.
3S. See Special Counsel ex. reI. Hardy v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. CB-120S12-0002-U-1 (MSPB Oct. 14,2011); Special Counsel ex. reI. Gayl v. Dep't of Navy, No. CB120S-12-0001-U-1 (MSPB Oct. 13,2011).
39. Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, supra note 37, at 2.
40. Nick Schwellenbach, Special Counsel Seeks Protection for Two Whistleblowers
(Oct. 10, 2(11), <http://pogoblo.typepad.com/pogo/2011110/special-counsel-seeks-protectionfor-two-whislleblowers.html> (quoting Richard Renner).
41. See Press Release, Govl. Accountability Project, MRAP Whislleblower to Return to
Work (Nov. 16, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/1592-mrap-
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Franz Gayl, who reported the Marines for failing to provide protective armor for vehicles in Iraq, stated:
The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) has been transformed under
the inspiring leadership of Carolyn Lerner. Since her arrival in the
summer of 2011 OSC has truly come to fulfill its intended mission
as a Federal guardian of whistleblower rights. For example, OSC's
determination to request a stay of an indefinite salary cutoff that
would have starved me out of the Marines and the Merit Service
Protection Board's willingness to support it, was the turning point
in my case during the darkest hours this fall, when I thought it
would be necessary to sell my home and give up. I don't think it
was a coincidence that the Department of the Navy then issued a
favorable
security adjudication that now permits me to get back to
42
work.

Moreover, the OSC filed an amicus brief in the case of a prominent whistleblower and former air marshal in his appeal of a MSPB
administrative judge's ruling against him, arguing that the MSPB was
improperly expanding a narrow exception to the Civil Service Reform
Act. 43 Noting these moves, a long-time employment lawyer in Washington, D.C. stated that, "[b]y taking the position that [Lerner] did,
and making it clear she was not going to be a wallflower or someone
who could just be walked over, ... she sent a very strong message that
whistle-blowers would be protected.,,44 According to the Washington
Post, Lerner has brought a jolt of energy to the Office of Special
Counsel because she took on long-neglected cases and, in several
high-profile cases, has "gone to the mat and tried to expand the
boundaries of the law's protections for whistleblowers.,,45
c. Administrative Review Board
One final area deserves mention: the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) of the Department of Labor. The ARB hears the final
whistleblower··to-return-to-work>.
42. Marcus Baram, Let's Ensure Whistleblowers' Good Deeds Go Unpunished, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2011,11:40 AM), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marcus-baram/
making-sure-that-whistleb_ b_11 05272.html>.
43. Stephen Losey, Decision to Fire Air Marshal Risks Silencing Whistle-Blowers, OSC
Says, FEDERAL TIMES (last updated Aug. 26, 2011), <http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20ll
0826/DEP ARTMENTS03/108260301/>.
44. Carrie Johnson, Government Whistle-lJIowers Gain New Advocate, NPR (Nov. 22,
2011), <http://www.npr.org/20111l1/221142599974/government-whistle-blowers-gain-newadvocate>; see also id. ("The agency has switched from being poison ivy for whistle-blowers to
being the first option for organizations like ours that are always looking for the best way to defend people who commit the truth.") (quoting Tom Devine).
45. Lisa Rein, Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner Quickly Raises the Profile of Her OiJlce,
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2011, at Cl.
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administrative appeals of whistleblower claims under twenty-one different federal whistleblower laws. 46 As with his other appointments,
Obama dramatically influenced the direction of the ARB. Obama's
Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis, appointed five new members to the
ARB's five-member panel in 2010 and 2011, and, as two whistleblower advocates remarked, "[t]ogether they have the most experience,
subject matter expertise, and demonstrated commitments to the
board's mission of any members in its history.,,47 For example, the
Board's Chair, Paul Igasaki, formerly chaired the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission during President Bill Clinton's Administration and has worked for numerous non-profit civil rights organiza48
tions. The Vice Chair, E. Cooper Brown, previously served on the
ARB during Clinton's presidency, and another member, Joanne
Royce, worked for GAP, the whistleblower advocacy group mentioned above, for fifteen years. 49
During a six-month period in 2010 after the appointment of four
of these new members, whistle blowers won six out of sixteen cases
(37.5 percent) before the ARB on the merits, as opposed to 19.75
percent (eight out of forty-one cases) in 2009. 50 However, more than
just statistics indicate the sea change caused by their appointments.
The ARB's recent decisions, particularly with regard to the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, expanded the scope of whistleblower protections
and overturned numerous Bush-era decisions adverse to whistleblowers. For example, when President Bush's appointees dominated the
Board, the ARB had a narrow view of the scope of protected conduct
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Although the Act's terms protected employees who reported any of six different types of misconduct,S1 including
violations of broad statutory provisions prohibiting mail and wire
fraud, the Bush ARB held that any whistleblower report must also
"be of a type that would be adverse to investors' interests."s2 If a whis46. See ARB Areas of Responsibility, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, <http://www.dol.gov/arb/
areas.htm> (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); The Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, <http://www.whistleblowers.gov/index.html> (last visited Apr. 16,2012).
47. DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 1, at 183.
48. ARB Board Members, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, <http://www.dol.gov/arb/members.htm>
(last visited Apr. 16,2012).
49. Id.
50. DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 1, at 183.
51. See 18 U.S.c. § 1514A (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who reports
conduct the employee reasonably believes violates laws against mail fraud, wire fraud, banking
fraud, securities fraud, "any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders").
52. See Platone v. FLYi, Inc., ARB Case No. 04-154, at 15 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at
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tleblower reported what she reasonably believed to be securities
fraud, then the ARB also required that the whistleblower demonstrate the fraud was material, which in essence required proving actual securities fraud, not just that the whistleblower "reasonably believed" securities fraud occurred as required by the statute's plain
language. 53 Moreover, the ARB held that a whistleblower's protected
disclosure must "'definitively and specifically' relate to any of the
listed categories of fraud or securities violations,,54 - another requirement absent from the statutory language.
In the summer of 2011, the new ARB overturned those holdings
in several sweeping opinions. First, the Board found that allegations
of mail and wire fraud did not also need to relate to shareholders' interests. 55 Second, the Board rejected its earlier holding regarding "materiality," by finding that a whistleblower will be protected when disclosing fraudulent conduct, even if a reasonable shareholder would
not consider it important in deciding how to vote. 56 Third, the Board
criticized the use of the "definitively and specifically" standard as "inappropriate" because it was imported from a case interpreting a different whistleblower statute with language not found in SarbanesOxley.57
Other cases reflected the ARB's willingness to apply the Act's
protections broadly. For example, almost immediately after Congress
passed Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, the issue arose whether privately-held
subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies could be held liable under

<http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARBIDECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/04_154.S0XP
.PDF>.
53. See id. at 16.
54. See id. at 17 (quoting Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 02-007, ALl No.
2000- ERA-31, slip op. at 9 (Sept. 30, 2(03), and adopting that case's interpretation of the whistleblower provision of a different statute, the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, 42
U.S.c. § 5851 (2006».
55. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., ARB Case No. 10-050, at 9 (Feb. 28, 2(11),
available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/10
_050.S0XP.PDF>; see also Funke v. Federal Express Corp., ARB Case No. 09-004, at 8 (July 8,
2(11), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/
SOX/09004.S0XP.PDF>; Sylvester v. Parexel, In1'l, ARB Case No. 07-123, at 21 (May 25,
2(11), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ ARB_DECISIONS/
SOX/07 _123.S0XP.PDF>. The Board arguably went even further and found that a whistleblower's protected disclosure did not have to disclose fraudulent conduct at all, as long as it
could be seen as "in furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud." Brown, ARB Case No. 10050, at 9.
56. Sylvester, ARB Case No. 07-123, at 21. The Board did leave open the possibility that a
complaint may concern "such a trivial matter" that there is no protected activity. See id. at 22.
57. [d. at 18.
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Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation provision. 58 The Bush ARB had determined that Sarbanes-Oxley could cover a subsidiary, but only
when the subsidiary acted as an agent for a publicly-traded parent
specifically to retaliate against the employee - a relatively narrow interpretation. 59 After this decision, administrative law judges (ALJs)
and courts still debated the issue until 2010,60 when Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 61
Dodd-Frank amended Sarbanes-Oxley to make clear that the Act
prohibited subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies from retaliating
against whistleblowers. 62 Although this legislation resolved the issue
going forward, the question remained whether the inclusion of subsidiaries in Sarbanes-Oxley would apply retroactively for cases that
arose before Dodd-Frank's enactment. The new Obama ARB determined that Dodd-Frank merely clarified Sarbanes-Oxley's true meaning, and that Sarbanes-Oxley should have always included subsidiaries as covered entities, essentially overturning Bush-era precedent. 63
The new ARB also interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley broadly to expand the concept of who could receive whistle blower reports. Sarbanes-Oxley'S language states that, in order to receive protection, a
whistleblower must report misconduct to "(A) a Federal regulatory
or law enforcement agency; (B) any Member or committee of Congress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee
(or such other person working for the employer who has the authority
to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).,,64 In July 2011, the
58. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 110-13, 134-37 (2007).
59. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Tech. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, at 15 (May 31,
2006), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/
SOX/04_149.S0XP.PDF>. This restriction arguably contravened the purpose of the statute and
resultcd in numerous dismissals of whistleblower cases by Department of Labor Administrative
Law Judges. See Moberly, supra note 58, at 134-37.
60. See Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., ARB No. 08-032, at 10-11 (Mar. 31, 2011),
available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ ARB/DECISIONS/ ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/
08_032A.SOXP.PDF> (citing cases with different holdings regarding this issue).
61. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act) (codified at
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
62. Section 929A of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Sarbanes-Oxley section 806(a) to add
the following italicized language regarding the entities that may not retaliate against a whistleblower: "No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.c. 780(d», ... including any subsidiary or affiliate
whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such company,
[may retaliate)." Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. at 1852 (codified at 18 U.S.c. §
1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2010».
63. See Johnson, ARB No. 08-032, at 16.
64. 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(a)(I).
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ARB interpreted this language to include a report to local or state
law enforcement, despite the ambiguity in the statutory language regarding whether "Federal" in subsection A modifies "law enforcement agency" as well as "regulatory. ,,65 Only protecting reports to
federal law enforcement would, according to Obama's ARB, result in
a "hypertechnical distinction" that would be inconsistent with the
goal of the statute to promote disclosures. 66 In September 2011, the
ARB also determined that Sarbanes-Oxley protected whistleblowers
who reported to the IRS as part of its whistleblower bounty program,
because the IRS is a "Federal regulatory ... agency. ,,67
Obama's ARB expanded upon what would be considered an
"adverse action" under Sarbanes-Oxley. In Menendez v. Halliburton,68 an employee had reported violations of accounting standards to
the company and the SEc. 69 Although this whistleblowing qualified as
protected activity, the ALl held that the employee did not suffer any
retaliatory adverse action. 70 The new ARB, however, reversed this
decision and detailed an easy standard for plaintiffs to meet in order
to satisfy the "adverse action" element of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim. 71
The ARB stated that "minor acts of retaliation can be sufficiently
substantial when viewed together," and therefore held that a whistleblower could recover if retaliation was "more than trivial,,,n a standard that likely would cover a broader range of retaliatory actions than
the Supreme Court previously found actionable for Title VII claims in
73
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. The ARB in
Menendez used this new standard to find an adverse action when a
company merely released the name of the whistleblower to its employees as part of its internal investigation into the employee's com-

65. See Funke v. Federal Express Corp., ARB Case No. 09-004, at 16 (July 8, 2011), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLICIARBIDECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS ISOX/09_004.

SOXP.PDF>.
66. Id.
67. See Vannoy v. Celanese Corp., ARB No. 09-118, at 12 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at
<http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLICIARBIDECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONSISOX/09_118.S0XP.PDF>.
68. ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/

PUBLICI ARBIDECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/09 _002.S0XP .PDF>.
69. See id. at 2-4.
70. See id. at 9, 1l.
71. See id. at 21.
72. fd.
73. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). The ARB distinguished Burlington Northern and found that the
case was helpful in determining the scope of prohibited actions, but was not dispositive because
Sarbanes-Oxley clearly prohibits "a very broad spectrum" of retaliatory activity, including nontangible adverse actions. See Menendez, ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, at 15-16.
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I · 74
pamt.
In addition to broadening Sarbanes-Oxley's reach, the new ARB
restricted employer defenses. In one remarkable case, Obama's ARB
even seemed to undermine an employer's ability to fire an employee
for revealing confidential information and taking confidential documents, if the employee uses that information and those documents as
part of the whistleblowing process. In Vannoy v. Celanese Corp.,75 a
whistle blower took confidential employer documents, including information related to personal information of current and former employees, to help substantiate his claims of wrongdoing.76 The ALJ
agreed with the employer's argument that it fired the employee because he violated his confidentiality agreement with the company,
and therefore the employee did not demonstrate that the employee's
whistle blowing was a contributing factor in his dismissal and that,
even if the firing and the whistleblowing were connected, the employer proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired
the employee anyway because of the breach of confidentiality.77 However, the ARB determined that the ALJ did not give sufficient weight
to the employee's need for internal documents in order to provide
original information to government regulators, and the ARB remanded the case for a further evidentiary hearing, noting that,
"[t]here is a clear tension between a company's legitimate business
policies protecting confidential information and the whistleblower
bounty programs created by Congress to encourage whistleblowers to
disclose confidential company information in furtherance of enforcement of tax and securities laws. ,,78
The ARB's new approach also can be seen in the way in which it
is deciding cases. In the first few years of Sarbanes-Oxley cases, ALJs
tended to dismiss cases based on summary adjudications, finding that
79
whistleblowers failed to prove their cases as a matter of law. In the
few cases in which ALJs held hearings, whistleblowers fared much
better, supporting the notion that whistleblower cases often present
74. Menendez, ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, at 22-26. The ARB supported this conclusion
by noting that this breach of confidentiality violated Sarbancs-Oxley Section 301's requirement
that companies provide a confidential, anonymous reporting channel for whistleblowers to report misconduct. See id.
75. ARB No. 09-118 (Sept. 28, 20ll), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/
DECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/09_118.S0XP.PDF>.
76. ld. at 5.
77. ld. al 7-8.
78. ld. at 15-17.
79. See Moberly, supra note 58, at 104-05.
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fact-intensive issues that need evidentiary hearings to explore. 30 The
new ARB seems to be sending a message to ALJs that they should
prefer evidentiary hearings over summary dispositions. In Sylvester v.
Parexel International, Inc. ,81 the ARB stated that "Rule 12 motions
challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings are highly disfavored by
the SOX regulations and highly impractical under the Office of Administrative Law Judge (OALJ) rules,,,82 in part because they involve
"inherently factual issues such as 'reasonable belief' and issues of
'motive,.,,83 Also, in Vannoy v. Celanese Corp.,84 the ARB reversed a
summary disposition in favor of the employer and ordered the ALJ to
conduct a detailed and specific evidentiary hearing. 85 It may be too
early to tell whether these cases constitute a trend toward demanding
that ALJs issue fewer summary judgments, but the ARB cases from
2011 seem, at a minimum, to indicate that the ARB understands the
negative impact summary dispositions can have on whistleblowers.
2. Legislation
President Obama also demonstrated his belief in the importance
of whistleblowing by supporting the addition of whistleblower protectibns in his most significant legislative achievements: the economic
stimulus package, health care reform, and the reform of the financial
industry.
a. Stimulus Bill
Immediately after taking office, President Obama signed the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,86 also called the
"Stimulus Bill," to respond to the recession and to create jobs. The
Act protects a broad range of disclosures by employees of non87
Federal employers that receive stimulus funds. On paper, the Act's

80. See id. at 127-28.
81. ARB No. 07-123 (May 25, 2(11), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/
DECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOXI07_123.S0XP.PDF>.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id.
84. ARB No. 09-118, at 12 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/
ARBIDECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/09_118.S0XP.PDF>.
85. Id. at 14-17.
86. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat.

115,297 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
87. See id. § 1553(a)(I)-(5), 123 Stat. 297 (protecting disclosures related to use of the stimulus funds, including a gross waste of the funds, gross mismanagement of them, or a violation of
law related to use of the funds).
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antiretaliation provision follows the "best practices" that began with
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and have developed in the last decade, including a burden of proof that seems favorable to whistleblowers. 88
Moreover, whistleblowers can report violations to a wide range of institutions and individuals, including both internal and external recipi89
ents. The Act provides for an administrative remedy first, but, like
Sarbanes-Oxley, permits whistleblowers to file claims in federal district court if the administrative process is not completed in a timely
manner. 90
Importantly, the Act's whistleblower provision also implements
new innovations that would be repeated by other Obama whistleblower protections. It prohibits the use of pre-dispute arbitration provisions to force a whistleblower to arbitrate claims brought under the
91
Act. Additionally, the Act expressly permits whistleblowers to use
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that their protected activity
played a "contributing factor" in the employer's retaliation, specifically including "evidence that the official undertaking the reprisal
knew of the disclosure" or "evidence that the reprisal occurred within
a period of time after the disclosure such that a reasonable person
could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the reprisal. ,,92
88. An employee must demonstrate that a protected disclosure was a "contributing factor"
in an employer deciding to take an adverse employment action against the employee. See id. §
1553 (c)(l)(A)(i), 123 Stat. 299. If the employee succeeds, the employer will be held liable for
damages resulting from the retaliation unless the employee can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action regardless of the protected activity.
See id. § 1553(c)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 299.
89. See id. § 1553(a), 123 Stat. 297 (protecting disclosures made to "the [Recovery Accountability and Transparency] Board, an inspector general, the Comptroller General, a member of Congress, a State or Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct), a court or grand jury, the head of a
Federal agency or their representatives").
90. See id. § 1553(c)(3), 123 Stat. 300 (permitting a whistleblower to file a claim for a jury
trial in federal court if the inspector general of the federal agency has not issued an order within
210 days after the submission of a complaint or has denied the whistleblower's claim). The whistleblower must first report retaliation to an appropriate inspector general, who must then investigate and submit a report to the whistleblower and the employer within 180 days. See id. §
1553(b), 123 Stat. 297-98.
91. See id. § 1553(d), 123 Stat. 301. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 both have similar
provisions. See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1558(b)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010) ("The rights and remedies in this section may not be
waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of employment."); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376,1739 (2010);
id. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031.
92. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, PUb. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(c)(1)
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b. Health Care Reform
Second, on March 23, 2010, Obama signed the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),93 commonly known as health
care reform. The PP ACA protects employees from retaliation if they
report violations of the ACt. 94 Although not as detailed as the Stimulus Bill's provision, the PPACA's whistleblower protections still provide the strong whistleblower protections found in other recent federal statutes, including permitting employees to make reports of
misconduct internally or externally, and protecting employees who
refuse to violate the ACt. 95 The PP ACA also adopts the employeefriendly burden of proof and procedures set out in recent whistleblower provisions such as Sarbanes-Oxley and the Consumer Product
Safety Improvement ACt. 96 In other words, the whistleblower must
file an initial administrative claim with the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration in the Department of Labor, which will determine whether the whistleblower's protected activity was a "contributing factor" in an adverse employment action. 97 If so, the whistleblower will prevail, unless the employer proves by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action regardless of the protected activity.98 Moreover, if the Department of Labor
does not finish its administrative review within 210 days, the whistleblower may file a de novo claim for a jury trial in federal district
court. 99
c. Wall Street Reform
Third, Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act on July 21, 2010. 100 While his other major
legislative achievements included antiretaliation provisions that mir(A)(ii)(I) & (II), 123 Stat. 115,299.
93. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
94. Id. § 1558(a), 124 Stat. 261.
95. See id.
96. See id. § 1558(b), 124 Stat. 261 (adopting procedures of Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2087(b) (Supp. IV 2010»; cf. 49 U.S.c. § 42121(b) (2006) (whistle-

blower procedures adopted by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b) (2006».
97. See 15 U.S.c. § 2087(b); 49 U.S.c. § 42121(b).
98. See id.
99. See 15 U.S.c. § 2087(b)(4) (adopted by The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, § 1558(b), 124 Stat. 261); cf. id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (permitting federal court claim after 180

days without a final resolution by the Department of Labor); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(E) (permitting jury trial).
100. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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rored other statutes, Dodd-Frank truly revolutionized whistleblower
law in the United States. Most importantly, the Act permits whistleblowers to file for rewards of 10 percent to 30 percent of any enforcement penalties recovered by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. lol These
provisions attempt to adopt the False Claims Act's "bounty" model,
which has been utilized successfully for decades to reward whistleblowers who reported fraud on the government.!02 Dodd-Frank extends this concept to reports of securities and commodities fraud on
the general public. 103
Within a year after Dodd-Frank's passage, the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) released rules and regulations implementing the Act's "bounty" program. I04 The three Democrats on the
SEC, including Chairman Mary Schapiro, the one Commissioner able
to be appointed by President Obama at the time, approved the controversial regulations over dissenting votes by the two Republicans
appointed by President George W. Bush.IOS Despite heavy lobbying
and pressure from business interests,l06 the SEC refused to require
whistleblowers to report internally through a company's grievance
101. ld. § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (Supp. IV 2010))
(SEC); ld. § 748,124 Stat. 1739 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.c. § 26) (CITC).
102. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financiallncentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82
(1992). Unlike the False Claims Act, however, Dodd-Frank does not permit the whistleblower
to litigate claims on behalf of the government.
103. Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)) (defining "whistle blower" as "any individual who provides ... information relating to a violation of
the securities laws").
104. See Securities Exchange Act, Release No. 34-64545, File No. S7-33-1O (May 25, 2011)
(to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 240 and 249). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued substantially similar regulations. See Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 23 of the Commodities Futures Act, 76 F.R. 53172 (Aug. 25, 2011). In this article, I will focus on the SEC provisions.
105. The five-year terms of the Commissioners are staggered so that one term ends on June
5 each year, and no more than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party. See
Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, <http://sec.gov/about/commissioner
.shtmb (last visited Apr. 17,2012). President Obama inherited a Commission with two Democrats, Ellise Walter and Luis Aguilar, and he appointed another Democrat, Chairman Mary
Schapiro. SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, <http://sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm> (last visited Apr. 17,2012) (providing information about presidential appointments and political affiliation of commissioners). All
three Democrats voted for the rules, while Commissioners Paredes and Casey, both Republicans appointed by President Bush, dissented. See id.; Resources, Office of the Whistleblower,
U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, <http://www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/owb/owb-resources.shtml#remarks>
(last visited Apr. 17,2012) (providing the Commissioners' remarks on the rules).
106. The SEC received 240 comment letters and approximately 1,300 form letters regarding
the proposed rules. See Securities Whistle blower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg.
34,300,34,300 (June 13,2011).
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procedure before reporting to the SEC (although the regulations do
include incentives for internal reporting).107 Moreover, the SEC
changed its proposed definition of whistle blower from one who reports "potential" violations to one who reports a "possible" violation
that may be "about to occur," and the whistleblower must simply
have a "reasonable belief" that the violation might OCCUL IOS The new
rules also provided some retaliation protection for auditors, lawyers,
and other compliance personnel who report misconduct - a stark difference from the proposed rules that mostly denied protection to
these whistleblowers. 109 Many perceived the SEC's rejection of industry demands as a positive sign that the SEC would begin to take whistie blowers seriously,110 although this remains to be seen because the
first awards will not be issued until sometime in 2012. However, within seven weeks of the beginning of the SEC's Dodd-Frank program,
the SEC received 334 whistleblower tips,!!! the quality of which, according to a former SEC lawyer, has been "remarkably high.,,1l2
Additionally, Dodd-Frank included another strong antiretaliation provision that permits whistle blowers to bring claims for retaliation directly in federal district court.1J3 In fact, the Act appears to provide corporate whistleblowers an interesting alternative to SarbanesOxley: because Dodd-Frank's protected conduct includes making a

107. See id. at 34,324-27.
108. See id. at 34,302-04.
109. See id. at 34,314-17.
110. See Thad Guyer, Final Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Rules: Are You Prepared?, GOy'T
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (June 15, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/
Guyer.pdf> (noting that SEC often chose whistleblower-friendly rules when faced with two
choices); Richard Renner, SEC's Dodd-Frank Rules Are a Major Victory for Whistleblowers,
WHISTLEBLOWERS PROT. BLOG (May 25, 2011), <http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2011/05/
articles/whistleblowers-tax-fraud/secs-doddfrank-rules-are-a-major-victory-for-whistleblowers/>
("The outcome [of the new rules] is a major victory for whistleblowers."); Press Release, Gov't
Accountability Project, SEC Issues Win-Win Whistle blower Rules (May 26, 2011), available at
<http://www .whis tl e b 10 wer. orglpress/press-release-archive/1134-sec-issues-win-win -whistl eblowerrules> ("Yesterday the SEC took the high road to strengthen the role of whistleblowers against
corporate fraud. It rejected demands by a big business 'fraud lobby' and House Republicans to
twist whistle blowing into obstruction of justice. ").
111. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 5 (2011), available at <http://sec.gov/about/
offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report-2011.pdf>. The report covers claims from Aug. 12,
2011, the date the regulations became effective, until Sept. 30, 2011, the end of the fiscal year.

See id.
112. See Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Receives 334 Tips in First Seven Weeks of Whistleblower
Program, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16,2011,3:21 PM), <http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/
11116/sec-receives-334-tips-in-first -seven -weeks-of-whistleblower-program/>.
113. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2010)).
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disclosure protected by Sarbanes-Oxley,1l4 whistleblowers who make
disclosures protected by both statutes may opt to bring a Dodd-Frank
claim because the statute of limitations is significantly longer (three
years versus 180 days for Sarbanes-Oxley) and the Act permits two
times the amount of back pay owed to the whistleblower, a bonus that
Sarbanes-Oxley does not offer. lls Furthermore, Dodd-Frank fixed
some of the flaws that had become apparent in Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation provision,1l6 such as extending Sarbanes-Oxley's statute
of limitations from ninety to 180 days, adding an explicit right to a jury trial if a whistle blower brings a claim in federal court, and clarifying that Sarbanes-Oxley protects employees of privately-held subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies.1l7 It also provides new
whistle blower protection for employees in the financial services industry who report fraud or illegal conduct related to the provision of
a consumer financial product or service. 118
d. Other Legislation
Other legislation passed during Obama's presidency contained
whistleblower protections. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009 (FERAt9 closed loopholes in the False Claims Act to
better encourage whistleblowers to report fraud on the government. 120
For example, FERA extended antiretaliation protection to contractors, sub-contractors, and agents who report fraud in addition to
"employees" that the FCA already covered. l2l Also, the Coast Guard

114. See id. (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii».
115. Compare id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(J)(bb» (three year statute of
limitations) and id. § 922(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii» (double back pay damages) with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2006) (180 day statute of limitations) and id. § 1514A(c)
(permitting damage claim for back pay, but not two times back pay).
116. See generally Moberly, supra note 58, at 132-37 (pointing out flaws in Sarbanes-Oxley's
antiretaliation provision).
117. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(c), 124 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b)(2)(D»
(180 days); id. (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b)(2)(E» (jury trial); id., § 929A, 124 Stat. 1852
(codified at 18 U.S.c. § 1514A) (adding language regarding subsidiaries).
118. See id. § 1057, 124 Stat. 2031 (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 5567).
119. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) [hereinafter FERAl.
120. The Senate Report accompanying the legislation noted that the changes were necessary
because "[tlhe effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently been undermined by court decisions which limit the scope of the law and, in some cases, allow subcontractors paid with Government money to escape responsibility for proven frauds." S. REP. No. 111-10, at 4 (2009). The
Report also detailed the ways in which the FERA amended the FCA "to clarify and correct erroneous interpretations of the law" by the Supreme Court. lei. at 10.
121. FERA, § 4(d), 123 Stat. 1624 (codified at 31 U.S.c. § 3730(h)(1) (Supp. IV 2010».
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Authorization Act of 2010 122 amended the Seaman's Protection Ad23
to greatly expand the types of conduct in which a seaman can engage
to be protected from retaliation 124 and to provide the same type of
"best practices" burdens of proof, administrative remedies, and de
novo review in federal district court as Sarbanes-Oxley and the other
recent antiretaliation statutes discussed above.!25 Most recently, the
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act,126 which President Obama
signed on January 4, 2011, provided new whistleblower protections
for employees who disclose violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. 127 Once again, the Act utilized the same best practices
from recent antiretaliation provisions. 128
In many ways, then, President Obama fulfilled Candidate
Obama's promises related to whistleblowing. His appointees arguably
revolutionized whistleblower protection for both public and private
employees. His legislative accomplishments included strong whistleblower protections. In short, whistleblower advocates have much to
cheer after three years of an Obama Presidency. Yet, despite this
strong support for whistleblowers generally, Obama seems to believe
that one type of whistleblower should receive less robust protection: a
whistleblower who makes disclosures related to national security, especially if one discloses classified information publicly, such as to the
media.
B. National Security: The Great Exception

The "national security whistleblower," as I use the term here, either works for an agency in the "intelligence community,,,129 like the
122. Pub. L. No. 111-281, § 611, 124 Stat. 2905,2969 (2010).
123. 46 U.S.c. § 2114 (Supp. IV 2010).
124. Coast Guard Authorization Act § 611(a)(3), 124 Stat. 2969 (codified at 46 U.S.c. §
2114(a)(1)(C)-(G) (Supp. IV 2010».
125. The Act deleted the previous provision allowing for a claim to be filed directly in federal court and adopted the "procedures, requirements, and rights" of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (ST AA), 49 U.S.c. § 31105(b) (Supp. IV 2010). See H.R. REP. No. 111-303
§ 2114 (2009) (showing deletions to old provision); Coast Guard Authorization Act § 611(a)(4),
124 Stat. 2969 (amending 46 U.S.c. § 2114(b) to reference 49 U.S.c. § 31105(b». The STAA
procedures, requirements, and rights mirror Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions. Compare 49 U.S.c. §
31105(b) with 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b) (2006).
126. Pub. L. No. 111-353,124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
127. See id. § 402, 124 Stat. 3968 (to be codified as 21 U.S.c. § 1012(a».
128. Compare id. with 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b) (2006).
129. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, defines the "intelligence community"
to include a wide variety of agencies:
(A) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
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National Security Agency, or reveals classified information (or both).
As discussed below, in some cases the Obama Administration reacted
with outright hostility to such whistleblowers, making a distinction between "bad" whistleblowing, which Obama calls "leaking" when it relates to national security, and "good" whistieblowing, which relates to
non-security issues. In other instances, the Obama Administration reacted with more nuance by acknowledging the need for some protection for national security whistieblowers, but rejecting calls for the
full panoply of rights the law typically provides other types of government whistleblowers.
1. Statements from Obama's Administration
The way the Obama Administration framed the issue through
public statements demonstrates this more nuanced approach. For example, in March 2009, less than two months into his presidency,
Obama gave some indication that he would make finer distinctions
about whistleblowing than his statements as a candidate might indicate. He released a signing statement with a spending bill that provided protection to federal officials who reported information to Congress in which he stated that the bill should not be interpreted to
undermine his authority to control communications with Congress "in
cases where such communications would be unlawful or would reveal
information that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential.,,130
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized
national intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps,
the
Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy.
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information.
(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the
President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and lhe head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.
50 U.S.c. § 401a(4) (2006).
130. Statement by the President (Mar. 11, 2009), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_ office/Statement-from-the- President-on -the-signing -of-HR -1105>. The law prohibits
the use of appropriations to pay salaries of anyone who "interferes with or prohibits" communications between federal employees and Congress related to the employee's job or agency. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 714(1), (2), 123 Stat. 524, 684.
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As the Brennan Center for Justice, a non-partisan public policy and
law institute affiliated with New York University School of Law, noted,
by objecting to a provision that was designed to prohibit retaliation
against employees who reveal executive misconduct, President
Obama's statement intentionally or unintentionally sends a message to employees: If you report misconduct to Congress against
the will of the head of your agency, and if the agency considers that
information "confidential," you may face retaliation. This could
have a chilling effect on potential whistle blowers and hinder the
public's ability to learn about government wrongdoing.13!

Shortly thereafter, in November 2009, Robert S. Litt, who President Obama appointed as General Counsel for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, promised action against "leaks of classified information that have caused specific and identifiable losses of
intelligence capabilities.,,132 More recently, in May 2011, Obama's appointment to head the Justice Department's national security division, Lisa Monaco, testified to Congress that "it would be my priority
to continue the aggressive pursuit of [leak] investigations" because
leaks do "tremendous damage.,,133 Monaco noted that "twice as
many" leak cases had been pursued during Obama's presidency than
in all previous Administrations. 134 Similarly, after the raid that killed
Osama bin Laden that same month, Leon Panetta, then the Director
of the CIA, sent a memo to CIA employees stating, "Disclosure of
classified information to anyone not cleared for it - reporters, friends,
colleagues in the private sector or other agencies, former Agency officers - does tremendous damage to our work. At worst, leaks endanger lives.,,135
The media has corroborated that this anti-leak mentality begins
at the top, asserting that Obama "is deeply troubled by leaks on sensitive national security matters like Afghanistan and Pakistan.,,136 In his
book, The Promise, Newsweek's Jonathan Alter wrote that "Obama

131. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TRANSPARENCY IN THE
FIRST 100 DA YS: A REPORT CARD 23 (2009), available at <http://brennan.3cdn.net/07b3343e216
944 f6d9 _ggm6ib3yb.pdf>.
132. Scott Shane, Obama Steps up Prosecution of Leaks to the News Media, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2010, at AI.
133. Shane, supra note 9.
134. Id.
135. Leon Panetta Warns CIA Employees: No More OBL Raid Leaks, ABC NEWS (May 19,
2011, 6:14 PM), <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/1eon-panctta-warns-cia-employces
-no-more-obl-raid-leaks/>.
136. Gerstein, supra note 8.
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had one pet peeve that could make him lose his cool ... leaks. ,,137 Jane
Mayer from The New Yorker related a conversation from a meeting
between Obama and a group of advocates for more transparency in
government, in which Obama "drew a sharp distinction between
whistle-blowers who exclusively reveal wrongdoing and those who
jeopardize national security.,,13s Ms. Mayer described a statement of
Danielle Brian from the Project on Government Oversight who attended the meeting, saying:
Obama's tone was generally supportive of transparency. But when
the subject of national-security leaks came up, Brian said, "the
President shifted in his seat and leaned forward. He said this may
be where we have some differences. He said he doesn't want to
protect the peoole
who leak to the media war plans that could imt39
pact th e troops.

Unfortunately, as described in more detail below,140 the line between
whistleblowing and leaking may not be as clear as Obama asserted
during that meeting. Nevertheless, the statement provides some context for evaluating President Obama's actions, which even more than
his Administration's statements, demonstrate his approach to national security whistle blowers.
2. Actions by Obama's Administration
At the same time that it supported whistle blowers in the nonsecurity context, Obama's Administration criminally prosecuted
those who publicly disclosed conduct related to national security,
conveyed a conspicuous lack of support for legislation that would improve protection for national security whistleblowers, and attempted
to force reporters to reveal confidential sources for stories disclosing
national security issues.
a. Criminal Prosecutions of Whistleblowers
Most alarmingly for whistleblower advocates, the Obama Administration used the Espionage Act, a statute typically reserved for
the treasonous act of giving secret information to an enemy, to prosecute six individuals who could be described as whistleblowers because
137. JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE 154 (2010). Alter reported that Obama is "fearsome" about leaks, although the leaks described in The Promise seem to relate to policy disputes that Obama believed were better handled internally rather than in the newspapers. See id.
at 155.
138. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 48.
139. See id.
140. See discllssion infi'a Part IV.A.
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they gave information about misconduct to the media. 141 For example,
the Obama (and Bush) Administrations criminally pursued Thomas
Drake, a former employee of the National Security Agency (NSA),
for allegedly disclosing classified information to a reporter. 142 Although Drake admitted telling a reporter that the NSA mismanaged
certain projects and wasted almost $1 billion on a flawed surveillance
system, he denied revealing any classified information. 143 Initially,
prosecutors charged Drake with Espionage Act violations carrying a
possible penalty of up to thirty-five years in jail.144 However, the DOl
ultimately dropped almost all of the charges. After five years of investigation, Drake pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of "exceeding
authorized use of a computer" and did not receive any fine or jail
·
145
t Ime.
The prosecution struck many observers as heavy-handed,146 particularly when the Department of Defense Inspector General released a report substantiating Drake's claims about mismanagement
147
and waste of public funds. Moreover, the evidence that Drake possessed classified information was thin. Indeed, l. William Leonard, an
official who was in charge of classifying information during the
George W. Bush Administration, recently filed a complaint against
the NSA for improperly classifying the document that formed the
core of the government's case against Drake, stating that he had
"never seen a more deliberate and willful example of government officials improperly classifying a document.,,148 Remarkably, the judge

141. Savage, supra note 9; Shane, supra note 9. These prosecutions total more than the three
previous cases brought by all previous Administrations combined. See id.
142. Mayer, supra note 7, at 47.
143. See id. at 55.
144. Id.; Glen Greenwald, Obama's Whistleblower War Suffers Two Defeats, SALON (July
30, 2011), <http://www.salon.com/news/departmenCofjustice/index.html?story=lopinion/green
wald/2011107130/whistleblowers>.
145. Ellen Nakashima, Judge Blasts Prosecution of Alleged NSA LeakeI', WASH. POST, July
29,2011, at A2.
146. See generally Mayer, supra note 7, at 48, 57 (describing reactions to prosecution). Even
Gabriel Schoenfeld, a noted conservative author who has argued for stronger protection of classified information, called the prosecution "draconian." See id. at 47.
147. See Kathleen McClellan, Inspector General Report Vindicates GAP Clients From National Security Agency, Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECr (June 23, 2011), <http://www.whistle
blower.org/blog/3111207>; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF.,
REPORT 05-INTEL-03, REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TRAILBLAZER AND THINTHREADSYSTEMS ii (2004), available at <www.whistleblower.org/storagc/documents/IGR.pdf> ("[T]he
NSA transformation effort may be developing a less capable long-term digital network exploitation solution that will take longer and cost significantly more to develop.").
148. See Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A16.
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even excoriated the prosecutors for their handling of the case, saying
that the prosecution was "unconscionable" and did not "pass the
smell test." 149
Another example involves WikiLeaks, the website begun in 2007
to provide an anonymous place that whistleblowers from all over the
world could post documents revealing government or corporate mis150
conduct. In 2010 and 2011, hundreds of thousands of classified U.S.
government documents were provided to WikiLeaks, which posted
them online and caused a diplomatic furor because they revealed embarrassing, and sometimes illegal, government conduct. 1s1 The Obama
Administration reacted strongly: it added the organization to its list of
enemies that threatened the security of the United States,152 claimed
that the release of documents put American troops in danger,153 and
ultimately arrested Army Private Bradley Manning for leaking many
of the documents to the website. 154 Human rights activists criticized
the Obama Administration for its treatment of Manning, who for the
first year of his arrest reportedly was held in strict solitary confinement and made to sleep with a "suicide-proof smock" rather than his
normal clothes. 1s5 The government also conducted a criminal grand
jury investigation of WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange,156
that at least one source, the Australian embassy in Washington, D.C.,

149. Nakashima, supra note 145.
150. What is Wikileaks, WIKILEAKS.ORG, <http://wikileaks.org/About.html> (last visited
Apr. 17,2012).
151. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,2010, at WK1;
Brad Knickerbocker, WikiLeaks 101: Five Questions About Who Did What and When, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1201/WikiLeaks-l01-Fivequestions-about-who-did-what-and-when/Who-is-responsible-for-the-Ieaks> (last visited Apr.
17,2012).
152. See Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18,2010, at A18.
153. See Scott Shane, WikiLeaks Leaves Names of Diplomatic Sources in Cables, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A4.
154. See Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video
Probe, WIRED. COM (June 6, 2010), <http://www.wired.com/threatleve1l2010/06/leak/>.
155. The Assoc. Press, Germany: An Appeal to Obama Over a U.S. Prisoner's Treatment,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A13; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon to Move Suspect in
Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at A12 (noting that Amnesty International had concerns over
Manning's treatment); Mark Benjamin, WikiLeakers and Whistle-Blowers: Obama's Hard Line,
TIME (Mar. 11, 2011), <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0.8599.2058340.00.html>.Philip
J. Crowley, a State Department spokesman stated that the Pentagon's treatment of Manning
was "ridiculous, counterproductive and stupid," a comment leading to Crowley's subsequent
resignation. See Bumiller, supra.
156. See Ellen Nakashima & Jerry Markon, WikiLeaks Founder Could Face Charges,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at AI; Shane, supra note 9.
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reported to be "unprecedented both in its scale and nature.,,157 Attorney General Eric Holder asserted publicly that publishing the government documents was a crime that should be prosecuted. ISS At the
time of this writing, the outcome of that investigation has not been released publicly.159
Obama's DO] prosecuted at least four other individuals for whistleblowing-type activities involving providing classified information to
the media. In 2010, the DO] prosecuted Shamai Leibowitz, a former
FBI translator, for sending classified information to a blogger. 16o
Leibowitz pled guilty to disclosing the transcripts from conversations
overheard by an FBI wiretap at the Israeli Embassy in Washington
DC, claiming that he was publicizing what he considered to be "a violation of the law. ,,161 The blogger who published the information
agreed, stating that Leibowitz provided the transcripts to him "because of concerns about Israel's aggressive efforts to influence Congress and public opinion, and fears that Israel might strike nuclear facilities in Iran, a move he saw as potentially disastrous.,,162 Leibowitz
. d a twenty-mont h pnson
.
receIve
sentence. 163
Also in 2010, the Obama Administration charged Stephen]. Kim
with violating the Espionage Act for allegedly providing classified information about North Korea to Fox News. l64 Kim is an expert on
North Korea's nuclear program who consulted with the State Department and talked with Fox about how North Korea might respond

157. Philip Dorling, US Targets WikiLeaks Like No Other Organisation, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Dec. 3, 2011, at 10, available at <http://www.smh.com.aultechnology/technology-news/
us-targets-wikileaks-like-no-other-organisation-20111202-10beo.html#ixzz1fV zUpHIT>.
158. See Julian E. Barnes & Evan Perez, Assange Probe Hits Snag, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,
2011, at A3; Assange Making Arrangements to Meet Police, Lawyer Says, CNN (Dec. 6, 2010,
1:59 PM EST), <http://www.cnn.com/201O/US/12/06/wikileaks.investigation/index.htmi>.
159. In November 2011, a federal judge permitted the DOJ to subpoena information about
WikiLeaks-related Twitter accounts. See DecJan McCullagh, Second Judge Gives DOJ Access to
WikiLeaks-related Twitter Accounts, CNET (Nov. 10, 2011, 12:24 PM PST), <http://news.cnet.
com/8301-31921_3-57322538-2811second -j udge-gi ves-doj -access-to-wikileaks-rela ted-twi tteraccounts/>.
160. Scott Shane, Leak Offers Look at Efforts by U.S. to Spy on Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2011, at AI.
161. Gerstein, supra note 8.
162. Shane, supra note 160; see also Richard Silverstein, Why I Published US Intelligence
Secrets About Israel's Anti-Iran Campaign, TRUTH OUT (Oct. 14, 2(11), <http://www.truthoULorg/why-i-published-us-intelligence-secrets-about-israels-anti-iran-campaign/1316550301>.
163. Adam C. Estes, Obama and Whistleblowers: Leak for Me but Not for Thee, THE
ATLANTIC WIRE (May 26, 2011), <http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/20llI05/obamawhistleblowers-war-dodd -frank/38192/>.
164. Shane, supra note 9; Benjamin, supra note 155.
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to proposed U.S. sanctions. 165 In January 2011, the DOJ arrested former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling and charged him with giving information to New York Times reporter James Risen about "a classified
clandestine operational program designed to conduct intelligence activities" and a "human asset" Sterling had handled for the agency.166
Finally, in January 2012, the DOJ charged former CIA agent John
Kiriakou with violating the Espionage Act by allegedly disclosing the
identity of a CIA. analyst to a journalist. 167 The Government Accountability Project asserted that the government targeted Kiriakou
because he had made public, remarks questioning the use of waterboarding as an interrogation matter. 16S
Obama's predecessors used Espionage Act prosecutions far
more sparingly. Before Obama became President, the government
charged only three individuals with violating the Espionage Act for
giving information to non-government actors, such as the media. The
most famous of these cases involved Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers in 1971, in which Ellsberg provided defense-related classified reports to the New York Times. 169 The case against Ellsberg was
dismissed because of the prosecutors' ethical violations. l7O Previous to
Leibowitz, the only successful Espionage Act prosecution of a government employee for giving classified information to a journalist occurred in 1984 when Samuel L. Morison was convicted of violating
the Espionage Act by giving satellite photographs of a Soviet ship to
Jane's Defense Weekly, a British publication. l7l Finally, in 2005, Lawrence Franklin, a Pentagon analyst, was charged with providing classified information about potential attacks on American forces in Iraq
to two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a
pro-Israel lobbying group.172 He pled guilty, but claimed he did not
165. See Horton, supra note 8.
166. Pierre Thomas et aI., Ex-CIA Agent Jeffrey Sterling Arrested, Accused of Leaking to
Reporter as Revenge, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), <http://abcnews.go.com/US/BIotter/cia-agentjeffrey-sterling-arrested-accused-leaking-reporterlstory?id=12557291>.
167. Savage, supra note 9.
168. Eric Tucker, Ex-CIA Officer Charged with Leaking Secret Info, <http://www.salon.com
12012/04/06/ex_cia_officeccharged_witlUeaking_secreUnfoI> (last visited June 22, 2012).
169. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
170. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
881,89911.115; William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1477-78 (2008).
171. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (4th Cir. 1988); Kitrosser, supra note
170, at 899. President Clinton later pardoned Mr. Morison. See Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Use of Espionage Law in Secrets Case Troubles Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, Ang. 6,2005, at AW.
172. See David Johnston & Eric Lichtblau, Analyst Charged with Disclosing Military Secrets,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at AI.
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want to hurt the United States; rather, he thought the lobbyists to
whom he gave the information would advocate for his position with
the Administration. 173
b. Avoiding Better Statutory Protections
These criminal prosecutions present the most public and vivid
indication of Obama's strong views regarding those considered to
have "leaked" classified information to the media. However, it could
be argued that these present isolated cases involving relatively few
individuals. 174 Indeed, counterexamples exist in which the Obama
DO] dropped charges or investigations against individuals accused by
the Bush Administration of improperly disclosing classified information. In 2009, the DO] approved the recommendation from career
prosecutors to withdraw charges against Steven ]. Rosen and Keith
Weissman,175 who the Bush Administration had accused of receiving
classified information from Lawrence Franklin, discussed above, and
giving it to a reporter and an Israeli diplomat. 176 In 2011, Obama's
DO] also dropped investigations of intelligence community employees who admitted giving New York Times' reporters information that
helped the Times expose Bush's domestic wiretapping program. 177
173. See Lee, supra note 170, at 1482; Scott Shane & David Johnston, Pro-Israel Lobbying
Group Roiled by Prosecution of Two Ex-Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, § 1, at 21. The
judge sentenced Franklin to twelve and a half years in prison, see Lee, supra note 170, at 1486,
Shane & Johnston, supra; however, the court subsequently reduced the sentence to ten months
of home detention, see Gerstein, supra note 8; Shane, supra note 132.
174. Indeed, one news report asserted that the "scattered" way in which the six cases developed "support the notion that they were not the result of a top-down policy." Scott Shane &
Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record in Leak Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2012, at A14. In the same article, however, the reporters quoted Attorney General Eric Holder, defending the DOJ against criticism that it was not investigating leaks sufficiently by telling the Senate Judiciary Committee, "We have tried more leak cases-brought
more leak cases during the course of this administration than any other administration." Id. The
reporters also note that the President is promoting his prosecution record "as a political asset."
Id. One other explanation for the increased prosecution could be that better technology makes
the leakers easier to track down through email andcellphonerecords.Id.
175. Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, U.S. to Drop Spy Case Against Pro-Israel LobbyL~ts,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A11. The prosecutors claimed that the judge had issued rulings
making the case to difficult to prosecute. See id. For example, the judge rejected the prosecutors' attempt to conceal classified information at trial, which would force the government to disclose it publicly. See id.; see also Shane & Johnston, supra note 173 ("Some legal experts say the
prosecution threatens political and press freedom, making a felony of the commerce in information and ideas that is Washington's lifeblood. Federal prosecutors are using the Espionage
Act for the first time against Americans who are not government officials, do not have a security clearance and, by all indications, are not a part of a foreign spy operation.").
176. See Shane & Johnston, supra note 173.
177. See Charlie Savage, No Prosecution Seen for Official in N.S.A. Leak, N.Y. TIMES, April
27,2011, at A17.
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Given the inherent distinctions that can be made among individual prosecutions, perhaps the Obama Administration's stance regarding enhanced statutory protections for whistle blowers provides a
more compelling example of its nuanced approach to national security whistleblowing. For years, whistleblower advocates and their allies
in Congress supported legislation aimed at fixing numerous loopholes
and defects in the primary legislation affecting federal government
whistleblowers, the Whistleblower Protection Act. 178 In 2007, the
House of Representatives passed H.R. 985 with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, 331_94. 179 The bill, called the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007 (WPEA), contained numerous improvements for federal whistle blowers, including access to jury trials
in federal court and protections for a broad range of disclosures about
government misconduct. 180 Importantly, H.R. 985 also provided new
rights and protections to national security whistleblowers, who typically do not receive statutory protection and often must rely on internal agency administrative procedures to remedy any retaliation they
experience for blowing the whistle. 181 Among other things, H.R. 985
protected national security whistle blowers who make disclosures
about misconduct to a broad range of congressional and executive
branch officials, and it allowed employees to bring claims of retaliation to federal coure 82 - a process whistleblower advocates have
claimed necessary to give full due process rights to government whistleblowers. 183 Additionally, the legislation barred revoking an employee's security clearance as retaliation for blowing the whistle 184 - a
common form of retaliation currently not prohibited. ISS It also limited

178. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-101, at 38 (2009) (detailing legislative attempts to pass improvements to the WPA).
179. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 153 (Mar. 14,2007), available at <http://c1erk.house
.gov/evs/2007/roIl153.xml>. Two hundred twenty-nine Democrats and 102 Republicans voted in
favor of the bill on March 14,2007. See id.
180. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007).
181. I discuss the law currently affecting national security whistleblowers in more detail in
Part III.B., infra.
182. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007). The protected disclosures would have mirrored
the disclosures under the WP A, as amended by the WPEA, which would have greatly expanded
the types of disclosures national security whistleblowers could make without fear of retaliation.
183. See Press Release, Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr., Major Reversal: House Cuts Whistleblower Jury Trials, (Nov. 3, 2011), available at <http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1293&Itemid=178> ("Access to jury trials is a hallmark in
all modern whistleblower laws and an absolutely essential provision to ensure that whistleblowers can have a fair hearing. ").
184. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007).
185. See Hesse V. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the use of the "state secrets privilege" in cases brought by whistleblowers,186 likely in response to the Bush Administration's highly publicized use of the privilege to prevent an FBI whistle blower from
bringing a claim in federal court. 187 The House bill required that a
court resolve an issue on which the privilege is claimed in favor of the
employee and also required the agency to submit a detailed report to
Congress whenever it invoked the privilege. 188 By any measure, H.R.
985 would have dramatically improved the protections available to all
federal government whistleblowers, specifically including national security whistleblowers.
As a candidate for President, Obama signed a declaration that he
supported government whistle blower protections "under the framework of H.R. 985.,,189 However, Obama's stance towards these provisions changed after he became President. Although H.R. 985 never
became law,190 in January 2009, the House attached to the stimulus bill
measures identical to H.R. 985's national security whistleblower pro191
visions. President Obama did not demand that they remain part of
the stimulus bill, and the Senate removed them before passing the
legislation in February 2009, a month after Obama took office. l92 The
next month, members in the House introduced federal government
whistleblower legislation again, and it contained protections for national security whistleblowers identical to H.R. 985. 193
However, the Obama Administration indicated that it had reser-

186. The state secrets privilege permits the government to withhold revealing military and
state secrets during a civil trial. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,7 (1953).
187. See MELISSA GOODMAN ET AL., DISAVOWED: THE GOVERNMENT'S UNCHECKED
RETALIATION AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 11 (2007) (discussing claim
of Sibel Edmonds).
188. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007).
189. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Joby Warrick, Obama, Gates at Odds Over Proposed Protections tor National Security Whistleblowers, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A3; Candidate Surveys, NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., <http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=58> (last visited Apr. 17,2012).
190. The Senate passed a companion bill, S. 274, but Congress never reconciled the two
bills. Notably, S. 274 did not contain the added protections for national security whistle blowers.
See S. 274, 110th Congo (2007).
191. See H.R. 1, l11th Congo § 1270 (2009); Brittany R. Ballenstedt, House Backs Whistleblower Provision in Stimulus Bill, GOVEXEC.COM (Jan. 28, 2009), <http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfed/Ol 09/012809b l.htm>.
192. See 156 CONGo REC. H8,974 (daily ed. Dec. 22,2(10) (Statement of Rep. Van Hollen)
(noting that provisions of H.R. 1507 were "stripped out of the Recovery Act during the conference with the Senate"); Smith & Warrick, supra note 189 (noting that the national security whistleblower provisions were dropped from the stimulus bill "after Sen. Susan Collins (Maine) and
other Republicans objected to their inclusion and the White House did not insist on it").
193. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 1507, l11th Congo
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vations about the national security whistle blower provisions. 194 Indeed, in a committee hearing on the new bill, H.R. 1507, an Obama
Administration representative, Rajesh De from DOJ, approved of
many of the bill's improvements for whistleblowers generally, but objected to H.R. 1507's enhancements for national security whistle195
blowers. De asserted that a provision permitting federal employees
a chance to appeal to a federal court when an agency revoked the
employee's security clearance was "inconsistent with the traditional
deference afforded Executive Branch decision-making in this area."l96
De also objected to federal district court review of MSPB decisions
regardirig national security whistleblowers because of "the sensitive
nature of the issues involved" with national security whistleblowers. 197
The Obama Administration instead endorsed retaliation protection
for national security whistleblowers through administrative procedures located entirely within the executive branch. 198
At the same time, the Senate considered S. 372, another version
of the WPEA, and held hearings at which De provided substantially
similar testimony on behalf of the Obama Administration. 199 In December 2009, a Senate committee endorsed S. 372, which provided for
national security whistleblower protection through an administrative,
rather than a judicial, process. 2OO By providing some antiretaliation
protection for national security whistleblowers, S. 372 potentially improved the current lack of any real protection;201 however, the bill included significantly less robust procedural protections than the judicial review found in H.R. 1507 (and H.R. 985 before that).202 The
194. Joe Davidson, Whistleblower Advocates Push for More from Obama, WASH. POST,
May 15, 2009, at A17.
195. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of2009 Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, lllth Congo 7 (2009) (statement of Rajesh De, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter De House Statement], available at <http://democrats.
oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090513192835.pdf>.
196. See id. at 9-10.
197. See id. at 11.
198. See id. at 7-10.
199. See Hearing on S. 372 - The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before
the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., the Fed. Workforce, & the Dist. of Columbia,
I1lth Congo 7 (2009) (statement of Rajesh De, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy,
Dep't of Justice), available at <http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdflrajeshde-whistJeblower-senate.pdf>.
200. See S. REP. NO. 111-101, at 76-80 (2009).
201. See discussion infra Part IILB. (discussing current legal regime affecting national security whistleblowers). The version of S. 372 originally introduced in the Senate did not contain
any protections for national security whistleblowers. See 155 CONGo REC. S1435-38 (daily ed.
Feb. 3, 2009) (providing text as introduced in Senate).
202. Instead, S. 372 required whistle blowers to appeal an employment decision to the agen-
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Senate committee specifically accepted the Obama Administration's
position that an administrative process would "better protect national
security information.,,203 Moreover, unlike H.R. 1507, S. 372 did not
contain any provisions related to the government's use of the state secrets privilege, nor did it provide for outside review of an agency decision to revoke an employee's security clearance.204
Given De's testimony at the House and Senate hearings on the
two versions of the WPEA, some whistleblower advocates blamed
Obama for abandoning the strong national security whistleblower
provisions of H. 1507 for the weaker version in S. 372. Not only did
the Obama Administration suggest the administrative protections as
an alternative to the judicial remedy of H.R. 1507, but also it became
clear that the White House and national security officials, who had
long objected to strong protections for intelligence community employees, worked with the Senate committee to craft a compromise bill
with the weaker provisions. 20s The National Whistleblowers Center
lamented that S. 372's "bad" provisions concerning national security
whistleblowers "have the tacit or express approval of the Obama
Administration, which throughout this process has deferred to the
views of the federal agency managers and heads of the intel agencies.,,206 News reports also indicated that Obama officials even weakened protections for FBI whistleblowers initially,207 although the bill
ultimately passed by the Senate in December 2010 retained the FBI's
cy head (rather than to a more independent Inspector General), who could control the resulting
investigation. See S. REP. No. 111-101, at 70 (2009). As part of the investigation, the agency
could submit ex parte information to the agency decision maker if "the agency determines that
the interests of national security so warrant." ld. The whistleblower would have a limited ability
to subpoena witnesses or to compel production of evidence. See id. A whistleblower could appeal the agency decision to an administrative board created by the new law; however, the board
would not conduct a hearing and would be dependent on the record accumulated by the agency
(the same agency accused of retaliation), including credibility determinations made by the agency. See id. at 71. The board proceedings would not need to be on the record nor even conducted
by administrative law judges, and the board could not share any of the ex parte evidence with
the whistleblower. See id. The board could award damages (capped at $300,(00) but could not
order reinstatement of the employee. See id. at 72. Finally, the bill would have permitted agencies to fire whistleblowers without any review whatsoever when the agency itself determines
that national security requires it. See id. at 73.
203. ld. at 30.
204. See id. at 79-80.
205. Tom LoBianco, WH Sought to Weaken Law on Whistleblowing, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2009, at AI; Smith & Warrick, supra note 189.
206. See David Colapinto, Shine More Sunlight on S. 372, WHISTLEBLOWERS PROT. BLOG
(Mar. 10, 2(10), <www.whistleblowersblog.org/2010103/articles/whistleblowers-governmentempl
Iterrorism/shine-more-sunlight-on-s-372/>.
207. See LoBianco, supra note 205; Kasie Hunt, Critics Question Whistleblower Bill, POLITICO
(Mar. 9, 2010, 4:44 AM EDT), <http://www.politico.com/news/storiesI0310/34105.htmi>.
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208

current protectIOns.
As the legislative session for the lllth Congress wound to a close
in December 2010, the House took up a measure identical to S. 372
rather than its own H.R. 1507, which had languished since the committee hearing eighteen months earlier. Yet, even the watered-down
provisions for intelligence community whistleblowers proved to be
too much for many Republicans,209 and the House amended its version of S. 372 to delete all of the national security provisions. 210 A lone
Senator put a hold on the bill when it returned to the Senate, and the
lllth Congress ended without passing any version of the WPEA. 211
Professor Geoffrey Stone, Obama's former colleague at the University of Chicago Law School, complained that the Obama Administration "cooled to the idea" of a statute with enhanced federal employee
whistleblower protection and "let it die" in the Senate. 212
However, after several Senators reintroduced the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act in 2011, generally along the same lines
as S. 372 from the previous Congress,213 Obama publicly supported
it. 214 This bill keeps many of the improvements to the WPA found in
previous versions of the bill, but retains the administrative remedies
for national security whistleblowers.2!5 Interestingly, instead of detailing specific enforcement procedures like S. 372, the proposed legislation simply grants the President the power to provide for enforcement

208. Compare 156 CONGo REC. S8803 (daily ed. Dec. 10,2010) (detailing S. Arndt. 4760 to S.
372, which did not include the FBI in the groups to which the administrative procedures were
available under Section 201 and which the Senate passed on Dec. 10,2010) with S. REP. No. 111101, at 68 (2009) (including FBI in groups affected by administrative procedures) and 156 Congo
REC. S8813 (daily ed. Dec. 10,2010) (reporting Committee's version to the Senate).
209. See 156 CONGo REC. H8974 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (Statement of Rep. Towns) ("I am
disappointed that we could not come to an agreement with the Republican side on extending
protections to employees in the Intelligence Community.").
210. See 156 CONGo REC. H8966-74 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010).
211. House Republican Leadership Asked Senator to Place "Secret Hold" on Federal Whistleblower
Bill, GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Apr. 4, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/press/
press-reI ease-archi veil 03 7-h 0 use-re pub Ii can -lead ershi p-ask ed -senato r -to-p Iace-q secre th 01 dqon-federal-whistleblower-bill>.
212. Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Untramparent President, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, at A21.
213. See S. 743, 112th Cong (2011). On Oct. 19,2011, the bill passed unanimously out of the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. See Dylan Blaylock, GAP
Praises Senate Committee Vote on Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, GOy'T
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1556gap-praises-senate-committee-vote-on-whistleblower-protection-enhancement-act>.
214. See Amanda Becker, Obama Pushes for Whistle-Blower Bill, ROLL CALL NEWS (Sept.
21, 2011), <http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_32/0bama-Pushes-for-Whistle-B1ower-BiII-08883l.html?pos=hbtxt>.
215. See S. 743, 112th Congo § 201 (2011).
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of its protections along the same lines as the WPA. 2I6 The administrative remedy seems to appeal to Obama; he has declared that even if
Congress does not pass the WPEA, his Administration might use executive orders to implement what he can.217
Thus, the Obama Administration took a more nuanced approach
to national security whistleblowing than candidate Obama's original
endorsement of H.R. 985 would have indicated. Although the Obama
Administration agreed the law should protect national security whistleblowers, it objected to providing them the same type of rights
available to other whistleblowers. Most dramatically, the Administration endorsed internal, administrative remedies instead of the
House's preferred judicial remedies.
c. Journalist Subpoenas
The Obama Administration also focused on journalists who revealed classified information. James Risen presents one specific example. He co-authored the New York Times article that exposed the
Bush Administration's domestic wiretapping program and wrote a
book, State of War, which described a failed government attempt to
undermine Iran's nuclear-weapons program. 218 Both the Bush and
Obama Administrations investigated the sources for Risen's stories
for years before Obama's prosecutors finally attempted to force Risen to testify against Jeffrey Sterling, the former C.I.A. officer charged
with revealing national security information to Risen. 219 In fact, the
Bush Administration dropped its attempt to subpoena Risen; however, the Obama prosecutors revived the effort by SUbpoenaing Risen's
credit reports as well as his personal bank and telephone records as
part of their investigation. 220 Issuing such subpoenas to a member of
the press presents a host of thorny legal issues, including a potential
clash with First Amendment protections. Accordingly, the Justice
Department's own rules require the Attorney General to approve
such subpoenas, demonstrating how seriously the Obama Administra-

216. See id.
217. See Becker, supra note 214.
218. See Jane Mayer, lames Risen's Subpoena, THE NEW YORKER (May 24, 2011), <http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/james-risens-subpoena.html>.
219. See Greenwald, supra nole 8; Mayer, supra note 218.
220. See Josh Gerstein, Feds Spy on Reporter in Leak Probe, POLITICO (updated Feb. 25,
2011, 12:15 PM EST), <http://www.politico.com/ncws/slories/0211150168.hlml>; Glenn Greenwald, Climate of Fear: lim Risen v. the Obama Administration, SALON (June 23, 2011, 4:24 AM
CDT), <http://www.salon.com/2011/06/23/risen_3/>.
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tion pursued Sterling. 221 Indeed, the prosecutor's motion requesting
the subpoena called Risen "an eyewitness to the serious crimes" at issue in the case, namely the disclosure of national security information. 222 Ultimately, a federal judge quashed the subpoena this past
summer.223
The Risen subpoena reflects a policy reversal for Obama with
regard to a reporter's right to protect sources, many of whom, of
course, could be called whistleblowers. In 2007 as a U.S. Senator,
Obama co-sponsored the Free Flow of Information Act, which would
provide a federal journalist-source privilege allowing journalists to
protect the confidentiality of their sources except in extreme circumstances, a right recognized by forty-nine states and the District of Co224
lumbia. As a candidate for President, Obama promised to give protection to journalists from having to reveal their confidential
sources. 225 However, as President, Obama demanded that exceptions
exist to require a reporter to reveal a source in order to protect national security,226 and he insisted that judges defer to the executive
branch's judgment on whether national security would be affected.227
Not surprisingly, whistleblower advocates have raised strong objections to these events. Thomas Drake's lawyer, Jesselyn Radack, of
the Government Accountability Project, called Obama's actions "brutal" and "a recipe for the slow poisoning of a democracy.,,228 The Os221. See Mayer, supra note 218; Shane, supra note 132 ("By Justice Department rulcs, investigators may seek to question a journalist about his sources only after exhausting other options
and with the approval of the attorney general. Subpoenas have been issued for reporters roughly once a year over the last two decades, according to Justice Department statistics, but such
actions are invariably fought by news organizations and spark political debate over the First
Amendment.").
222. See Mayer, supra note 218.
223. Greenwald, supra note 144.
224. Stone, supra note 212. To overcome the privilege, the government would have to prove
that disclosing the information would prevent significant harm to national security. See id.
225. See Charlie Savage, White House Proposes Changes in Bill Protecting Reporters' Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2009, at A17; Clint Hendler, A Change That's Hard to Believe In,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 2, 2009, 10:12 AM), <http://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/a_
change_thats_hard_to_believe.php> (providing transcript and quoting campaign speech by
Obama from Apr. 15,2008).
226. See Shane Harris, Plugging the Leaks, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 2010, at 33, available at <http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/plugging-the-leaksl>; Savage, supra note
225 ("The Administration this week sent to Congress sweeping revisions to a 'media shield' bill
that would significantly weaken its protections against forcing reporters to testify" by not permitting protections for leaks involving "significant" harm to national security).
227. Stone, supra note 212.
228. Thomas Drake & Jesselyn Radack, A Surprising War on Leaks Under Obama,
PHILL Y.COM (Aug. 1, 2011), <http://articles.philly.com12011-08-01lnews129838846_L whistleblowers-jesselyn-radack-obama>.
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car-nominated director of a film about Daniel Ellsberg, of Pentagon
Papers fame, claimed that Obama is the "worst President in terms of
his record on whistleblowing.,,229 Obama's proposed national security
provisions for the WPEA provoked substantial criticism as wel1. 230 His
former colleague, Professor Stone, criticized some of Obama's moves
in a New York Times editorial titled, "Our Untransparent President. ,,231
The Obama Administration's actions provoked strong reactions
from the media too. Glenn Greenwald from Salon.com called
Obama's prosecutions "the most aggressive crusade to expose, punish
and silence 'courageous and patriotic' whistleblowers by any President in decades.,,232 The Atlantic complained that Obama is "waging a
war on whistleblowers within the federal government,,,233 a sentiment
others have echoed. 234
However, the Obama Administration's involvement in the winding legislative path of the WPEA indicates a more nuanced attitude
towards national security whistleblowers than demonstrated by the
media hyperbole. Obama is not necessarily conducting a "war" on national security whistleblowers, because he has supported legislation
protecting them. However, he may be conducting a battle for national
security secrecy. He prioritized the protection of classified national
security information by attempting to limit the ways in which intelligence community whistleblowers could disclose misconduct and the
229. Ben Dowell, Barack Obama Worst President for Whistleblowers, Says Film-maker, THE
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2011, 13:22 EDT), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jun/09/barackobama-worst-president-for-whistleblowers>.
230. See Julia Davis, Here Comes the Bride of Frankenstein, EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 5, 2011),
<http://www.examiner.comlhomeland-security-in-los-angelesIhere-comes-the-bride-offrankenstein>
("The WPEA is replete with deceptive guillotines masquerading as haircut machines."); Greenhouse: Senate Bill "Treats Whistleblowers as Second-class Citizens", Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr.
(Dec. 15, 2010), <http://www.whistleblowers.orglindex.php?option=com30ntent&task=view&
id=1166&Itemid=189> (noting that Bunnatine Greenhouse, an Army Corps of Engineers whistleblower who testified before Congress on whistleblower protections, stated that S. 372 "leaves
national security whistleblowers out in the cold"); LoBianco, supra note 205 (quoting Tom
Devine from the Government Accountability Project stating that "the White House changes [to
the WPEA] created obstacles that could stymie national security whistleblowers, such as a new
review panel to hear complaints from intelligence employees who bring allegations of wrongdoing to light"); Senate Passes S.372: A Bad Deal for Whistleblowers, Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr.
(Dec. 11, 2010), <http://www.whistleblowers.org/illdex.php?option=com_colltent&task=view&
id=1163&Itemid=71> (stating that S. 372 does "little to aid" national security whistleblowers).
231. See Stone, supra note 212.
232. Greenwald, supra note 8; see also Benjamin, supra note 155 (noting that the Obama
Administration "is rapidly establishing a record as the most aggressive prosecutor of alleged
government leakers in U.S. history").
233. See Estes, supra note 163.
234. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 8; Horton, supra note 8.
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procedures they could invoke to remedy any retaliation they encounter. For Obama, administrative (rather than judicial) remedies for
whistle blowers keep national security secrets within the executive
branch and do not expose them to outsiders like Congress, judges, or
the media. The criminal prosecutions and the Obama Administration's focus on "leaks" to the media supported the goal of national security secrecy. Obama appears to believe that not all whistleblowers
are bad, just the ones who publicly disclose classified information
when they blow the whistle. To put it bluntly, when it comes to national security, Obama would rather protect secrecy than protect
whistle blowing.
This distinction between Obama's broad support for whistleblowing generally and his lack of support, often even condemnation,
of whistleblowing about national security (or, more disparagingly,
"leaking") deserves further exploration. Part III, below, analyzes the
source for Obama's disdain for leaking and concludes that Obama's
stance continues a long-standing presidential attitude toward national
security whistleblowing based on constitutional separation of powers
concerns. Obama, however, may be unique among his predecessors
because of his strong support for other types of whistleblowers, making the distinction more apparent. Part IV evaluates the merits of
Obama's singular distinction between national security whistleblowers and other types of whistleblowers.

III. WHISTLEBLOWING, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS

Conflicts over secrecy ... are conflicts over power: the power that
comes through controlling the flow of information.
Sissela Bok (1982/

35

From the earliest days of the republic, the government has had to
consider how to respond to executive branch employees who disclose
misconduct in the national security arena. As Stephen Kohn, a wellknown whistleblower advocate and lawyer, pointed out in The New
York Times, Congress has encouraged people to report abuse and illegal conduct since the days of the Revolutionary War, when ten
American sailors informed Congress that their commander treated
prisoners of war inhumanly.236 After the commander retaliated against
235. BOK, supra note 12, at 19.
236. See Stephen M. Kohn, The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at A23.
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the whistleblowers, Congress passed what Mr. Kohn called "America's first whistle-blower protection law":
That it is the duty of all persons in the service of the United States,
as well as all other inhabitants thereof, to give the earliest information to Congress or any other proper authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors committed by any officers or persons
237
in the service of these states, which may come to their knowledge.

Two centuries later Daniel Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times, resulting in his prosecution under the
Espionage Act. The landmark Supreme Court opinion that arose out
of that case addressed the First Amendment rights of the recipient of
classified information, but left open the question regarding the legal
rights a whistleblower may have to disclose classified information
about illegal or improper government conduct. 238 Most recently, the
"War on Terror" that began after the September 11, 2001 attacks led
to numerous government employees publicly disclosing information
that touched on national security. These individuals believed they reported illegal or unethical government acts, such as the warrantless
wiretapping by the National Security Agency,239 the CIA renditions
and water torture of suspected terrorists,240 and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse. 241
These examples and others follow a similar pattern and reinforce
the definition of "national security whistleblower" I set out above: an
executive branch employee who either works in the "intelligence
community" or reveals classified information, or both.242 Ellsberg met
both definitions: he worked for the Department of Defense and revealed classified information. 243 Thomas Drake worked for the National Security Agency, but claims not to have disclosed anything

237. See id.
238. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Lee, supra note
170, at 1478 n.133.
239. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 14 (discussing case of Russell Tice); Michael
P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 567, 573-74 (2006); Michael lsikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22,
200S, at 40, available at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweekI2008112/12/the-fed-who-blewthe-whistle.html> (discussing the case of Thomas Tamm who told the New York Times that the
NSA was intercepting phone calls and emails in U.S. without judicial warrants).
240. See Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 572-74; Jameel Jaffer & Larry Siems,
Honoring Those Who Said No, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at 25.
241. See Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 572-74; Jaffer & Siems, supra note 240.
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See Daniel Elisberg, Secrecy and National Security Whistleblowing, 77 Soc. RES. 773,
787-88 (2010).

2012]

wflISTLEBLOWERS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY

91

classified. 244 Conversely, Thomas Tamm worked for the DO] (not
technically part of the "intelligence community"), but helped blow
the whistle on the highly classified, but arguably illegal, NSA wiretapping program. 245 In the typical pattern, the national security employee discovers conduct the employee believes to be illegal or immoral, often relating to classified or confidential information, and
tells Congress or the media about it. 246 Most recently, as noted above,
the Obama Administration has ratcheted up government reaction to
such actions by criminally prosecuting employees who arguably could
be called whistleblowers. 247
One explanation for Obama's intense reaction towards national
security whistleblowers may be that such whistleblowers present a
President with a unique dilemma. On the one hand, presidential decision making, particularly about national security, requires some
amount of secrecy.248 Executive branch officials need some private
space in order to provide candid advice to the President and to vet
proposals without the distorting impact of public scrutiny. Employees
who blow the whistle undermine this process and destroy the ability
of Presidents to keep what one author has called "necessary secrets. ,,249 On the other hand, the Constitution promotes government
transparency and Congressional oversight of the executive branch. 250
Whistleblowers who expose misconduct play an important role in
making the government transparent and assisting in inter-branch
oversight. In other words, President Obama's nuanced approach to
national security whistleblowing is part of a larger context related to
these tensions that, at their core, result from the Constitution's sepa244. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 55.
245. See Isikoff, supra note 239; Savage, supra note 177, at A17.
246. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWERS (2005), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33215.pdf>;
GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187; Katel, supra note 32, at 265; Lee, supra note 170, at 1454-55.
For example, Jesselyn Radack, a former FBI legal counsel, told a reporter about alleged "barbaric" treatment of John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban," after his arrest, and claimed
to have been retaliated against as a result. See Drake & Radack, supra note 228. Radack claims
to have "warned the Justice Department against interrogating [Lindh] without an attorney" and
"exposed the FBI's ethics violations in deciding to proceed, its barbaric treatment of him, and
the mysterious disappearance of evidence of the warning from DOJ files." ld.; see a/so Eric
Lichtblau, Dispute Over Legal Advice Costs a Job and Snarls a Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, May
22,2003, at A15.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 141-73.
248. See BOK, supra note 12, at 191.
249. See generally GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY,
THE MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011).
250. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92
IOWA L. REV. 489, 522 (2007).
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ration of powers among co-equal branches of government. 2S1
A. Valuing Oversight and Transparency over Secrecy

Whistleblowing, particularly by executive branch employees to
Congress, brings to a head these arguments about the competing
needs for executive secrecy and Congressional oversight. Such arguments have resulted in various attempts to balance these opposing interests depending on the circumstances surrounding the whistleblowing. Presidents of both political parties have long maintained that the
chief executive can keep some secrets from Congress in order to do
the President's job effectively.252 Thomas Jefferson noted, "The Senate is not supposed by the Constitution to be acquainted with the
concerns of the Executive Department. It was not intended that these
should be communicated to them.,,253 Indeed, some commentators
have asserted that the President's ability to keep secrets presents one
of the great strengths of the executive branch. 254 Professor Heidi
Kitrosser examines these arguments and goes one step further by asserting that "[i]t is virtually inevitable that the President's constitutional capacity for secrecy expands dramatically over time,,255 due to
the bureaucratic and technological realities of the office.256 Obama's

251. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 2 ("Whistleblower activity is often viewed as a struggle
between the executive and legislative branches.").
252. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2701 - INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1 (2009), available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php
?pid=86389> (opposing changes to broaden executive branch reporting requirements to Congress because they "would undermine what the executive branch refers to as a 'fundamental
compact between the Congress and the President' regarding the reporting of intelligence activities, 'an arrangement that for decades has balanced congressional oversight responsibilities with
the President's responsibility to protect sensitive national security information"); Kathleen
Clark, "A New Era of Openness?": Disclosing Intelligence to Congress Under Obama, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 313,327-28 (2010) ("For decades, Presidents have claimed the right to control classified information and internal legal advice."); Katel, supra note 32, at 272 (quoting President
George W. Bush official asserting that executive privilege doctrine includes keeping "intraagency deliberative materials prepared for senior officers in executive departments" from Congress); Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1061 (2008).
253. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on Ihe Powers of Ihe Senate (Apr. 24, 1790), in THE
JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA (John P. Foley ed., 1900), quoted in Glenn Sulmasy, Panel: Secrecy and Barriers 10 Open Government, transcript from Symposium: Left Out in the Cold? The
Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9111 America, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1229,
1233 n.56 (2008).
254. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 887 (discussing writing of Alexander Hamilton
and John Jay).
255. See id.
256. See id. at 887-89.
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first signing statement, noted above, demonstrates that he takes the
traditional executive's view that the President should be able to control federal employee communications to Congress "where such
communications would be unlawful or would reveal information that
is properly privileged or otherwise confidential.,,257 In contrast, Congress and others have insisted that the legislative branch maintains
constitutional authority to oversee all of the executive's actions,258 including those related to national security. Congress, as a representative body, provides the best means for public oversight in a democracy, but only if Congress has access to information about the
government's programs. 259
Over the last century, each branch has erected legal bulwarks in
this intra-governmental dispute between transparency and secrecy as
it relates to executive branch employees providing information to
Congress to assist the legislative branch in its oversight responsibilities. For example, in 1902 and 1909, Presidents Roosevelt and Taft,
respectively, issued "gag" orders in which they ordered executive
branch employees to speak with Congress only if approved by their
department head. 260 Congress became concerned that these orders
would stifle its ability to oversee the executive branch, and, in 1912, it
passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act,261 rejecting these orders and declaring that no one should interfere with the "right" of federal employees
to talk to Congress. 262
The debate continued in more modern times. When Congress
257. Statement by the President supra note 130. The law prohibited the use of appropriations to pay salaries of anyone who "interferes with or prohibits" communications between federal employees and Congress related to the employee's job or agency. Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 684, Div. D, § 714(1) & 714(2).
258. See SEN. REP. No. 111-101, at 27 (2009) (noting that a previous Senate committee had
determined that a bill permitting intelligence community employees to disclose information to
Congress was constitutional because "the regulation of national security information, while implicitly in the command authority of the President, is equally in the national security and foreign
affairs authorities vested in Congress by the Constitution"); Katel, supra note 32, at 272 (quoting memo from Congressional Research Service attorney concluding that "Congress has a clear
right and recognized prerogative ... to receive from officers and employees of the agencies and
departments of the United States accurate and truthful information regarding the federal programs and policies"); Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1063-64.
259. See Morton H. Halperin & Daniel N. Hoffman, Secrecy and the Right to Know, 40 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 132, 132 (1976) ("Congress, acting in behalf of the public, should first direct, and then oversee executive Administration.").
260. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 2-3.
261. 37 Stat. 555, § 6 (1912). This language was carried forward and supplemented by the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and is codified as permanent law. See 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
262. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 3; Thomas Newcomb, In from the Cold: The Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998,53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1235, 1239 n.lO (2001).
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passed the Inspector General Act of 1978,263 it clashed with the President over whether Inspector Generals (IGs) must report findings of
misconduct to Congress. 264 The House originally required IGs to report "particularly serious or flagrant" concerns to Congress within
seven days after discovery and without obtaining approval from executive branch agency heads. 265 The Office of Legal Counsel objected
because the provision potentially conflicted with the President's constitutional right to withhold information from Congress on the basis
of executive privilege: the President claimed the authority to control
whether and how executive branch IGs should report information to
Congress. 266 The Senate version of the bill, which ultimately became
law, compromised and required IGs to report "particularly serious or
flagrant" concerns to agency heads, who should then provide them to
267
Congress. The Senate Report on the provision acknowledges, however, that "the President's constitutional privilege for confidential
communications" may require an agency head to alter or delete information before reporting to Congress. 268 This awkward compromise
between the two branches gives Congress some oversight over the
most serious problems reported to IGs, but appears to leave the President with the power (through his agency heads) to conceal what he
considers constitutionally privileged information.
The quarrel extends beyond the IG process. Since the early
1980s, Presidents have required executive branch employees to sign
nondisclosure agreements, while Congress has refused to provide any
funds to enforce the agreements or to pay the salary of any executive
branch official who prevents an employee from communicating with
Congress. 269 Congress repeatedly passed provisions in appropriation
bills that require the nondisclosure agreements both to prohibit employees from disclosing classified information and to clarify that the
prohibition does not apply to disclosures to Congress or to law enforcement related to a substantial violation of law. 270
263. 5 U.S.c. app. § 5(d) (2006).
264. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1257-60.
265. See id. at 1258 (citing S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 30-32, summarized in pertinent part in,
H.R. REP. No. 105-747, at 18-19 (1998)).
266. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 30-32, summarized in pertinent part in, H.R. REP.
NO. 105-747, at 18-19 (1998)).
267. See 5 U.S.c. app. § 5(d); Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1258-59.
268. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1258-59 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 31-32 (1978),
quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 105-747, at 18-19 (1998)).
269. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 24-28.
270. See id. at 28.
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Although President Obama supported whistleblower protections
generally, he demonstrated a willingness to continue the arguments
made by his predecessors for a strong executive privilege. For example, the Obama Administration refused to allow its social secretary to
testify before Congress regarding security at a White House dinner
because, as Obama's press secretary noted, "[b]ased on the separation of powers, staff here don't go to testify in front of Congress.,,271
Nevertheless, despite the gag orders and nondisclosure agreements, for the typical federal government whistleblower, the balance
generally seems to be in favor of Congressional oversight and transparency because, at least on paper, the law protects most federal government employees who report most types of misconduct. The WP A
provides remedies for many federal employees who suffer retaliation
for disclosing government misconduct, such as illegal behavior, mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.272 Although administrative and court decisions have undermined these protections
somewhat,273 on paper, the WPA provides robust whistleblower protection because it protects disclosures on a wide range of misconduct
to a broad group of people, including to an employee's supervisor,
Congress, or even the press if necessary.274 Moreover, entities independent of an employee's agency will investigate and adjudicate
claims of retaliation, which ultimately could be heard by the judicial
branch on appeal.275
B. Switching the Balance for National Security Whistleblowing

The laws affecting national security whistle blowers differ dramatically from these general provisions. As discussed in more detail below, employees may report misconduct related to national security to
271. Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. COMMENT.
483, 519 (2010) (quoting Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case,
WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 2009, at C7) (internal quotation marks omitted). In non-whistieblower
contexts, Obama also asserted executive privilege positions eerily familiar to positions claimed
by his predecessor, George W. Bush. See generally Stone, supra note 212. For example, President Obama continues to assert the state secrets privilege with regularity, even to defend actions taken by the Bush Administration related to the CIA renditions and the NSA wiretapping.
Seeid.
272. See 5 U.S.c. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2006).
273. See Devine Statement, supra note 18, at 13-19.
274. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 16-21.
275. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-04 (2006) (describing MSPB); id. §§ 1211-14 (describing OSe); id.
§ n03(b)(1) (providing for review of MSPB decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
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a more limited group of people, excluding most of Congress and all of
the public. Moreover, less protection from retaliation exists, and the
judicial branch has no oversight of retaliation claims because the
claims are adjudicated administratively within the executive branch
and often within the whistleblower's own agency, if at all.
1. The Classification System for National Security Information

A primary reason for the difference in the law's treatment of
these types of whistleblowers relates to the different nature of the information being shared by the whistleblowers. A "national security
whistle blower" often reveals "classified" information subject to special rules about its disclosure. The classification system for the federal
government results from a Presidential executive order describing the
various levels of secrecy that applies to certain types of information. 276
Presidents also control whether an individual receives a security
clearance providing access to classified information. 277 As a result,
whether information is classified, and therefore subject to tighter restrictions on whether and how it can be disclosed, "is almost entirely
under the control of the executive branch.,,278 Further, the executive
branch can utilize criminal prosecution to enforce secrecy related to
certain types of classified information. 279 For example, the Espionage
Act of 1917, mentioned above, protects the secrecy of national defense information. 28o Presidents claim to derive the power to control
276. See Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 890-91 (describing the classification system); KEVIN
KOSAR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526, at 3 (2010), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41528.
pdf> ("[C]lassified information policy largely has been established through executive orders.").
277. See KOSAR, supra note 276, at 4 (noting that executive orders typically have defined
"who in the federal government may classify information, what levels of classification and classification markings (e.g., 'top secret') may be used, who may access classified information, and
how and when classified information is to be declassified"); see also Exec. Order No. 13,526, §
4.1, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2(10) (limiting access to classified information to those who
demonstrate eligibility to an agency head, sign a nondisclosure agreement, and have a need to
know the information).
278. Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 890; see aLw KOSAR, supra note 276, at 5 (noting that
Congress passed provision in the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act "allowing the
President to have a lead role in devising classified information policy").
279. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CRIMINAL
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 10 (2011), available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/148793.pdf> (detailing criminal penalties).
It should be noted, however, that the U.S. does not have a criminal statute prohibiting the public disclosure of classified information generally - the statutes prohibit disclosing specific types
of classified information. See id. In contrast, the United Kingdom has an "Official Secrets Act"
that criminally penalizes the disclosure of any government secret. Congress passed a similar act
in 2000 but President Clinton vetoed the bill. See id. at 25-26.
280. Espionage Act of 1917,18 U.S.c. §§ 793-99 (2006).
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the secrecy of national security information from the Constitution,
which appoints the President as Commander in Chiet,281
Supreme Court holdings provide part of the basis for this view as
well. The Court determined in Department of Navy v. Egan,282 that the
Merit Systems Protection Board could not review the revocation of
an employee's security clearance by an executive agency.283 In so doing, the Egan Court waxed philosophically about the President's constitutional role as Commander in Chief under Article II and asserted
that the
authority to classify and control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch
that will give that person access to such information flows primarily
from this constitutional investment of power in the President,
and
284
exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.

Moreover, in separate cases, the Court determined that the President,
in some circumstances, has a privilege to refuse disclosing to courts
confidential communications regarding national security and military
issues. 28s Additionally, in Snepp v. United States,286 the Court noted
that the government has a "compelling interest" in withholding national security information from unauthorized persons. 287
However, the Constitution also provides Congress with oversight
responsibilities, which leads to an inevitable conflict regarding when
the President must provide national security information to Congress. 288 Interestingly, none of the Court's rulings provides the answer
to whether the Constitution permits the President to withhold national security information from Congress - as compared to the prohibi281. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 1; see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1 (2011), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RS21900.pdf> (noting that Presidents,
including President Obama, cite constitutional authority when issuing an executive order related
to classified information); Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1061-62; Kitrosser, supra note 271, at
507; Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1239-40; Sulmasy, supra note 253, at 1233 ("[T]he founders, as
well as many modern administrators in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, have
strongly insisted that the media, the citizenry, and even Congress are presumptively not privy to
most wartime secrets and intelligence activities.").
282. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
283. Id. at 530.
284. Id. at 527.
285. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
286. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
287. See id. at 509 n.3.
288. See Kitrosser, supra note 250, at 522 (summarizing arguments that Congress has a constitutional role in checking the President's secrecy-keeping powers).
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tions against disclosure to the public generally.289 Egan dealt with
whether an executive agency had authority to question the security
clearance judgment of another executive agency, importantly noting
that the Executive Branch has authority in military and national security affairs, "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise.,,290
Reynolds and Nixon addressed executive privilege in the context of
revealing national security information to litigants and courts, not
Congress. 29 ! Snepp held only that the CIA's contractual requirement
that a former CIA agent obtain approval before publishing material
related to the CIA was a reasonable way for the CIA to protect its interest in maintaining the "secrecy of information important to our national security.,,292 Thus, the question of how much information Congress can demand from the President regarding national security
remains somewhat of an open question as a constitutional matter.
The Security Act of 1947 resolves some of this conflict through a
delicate and complicated arrangement that details when the executive
branch must share classified information with Congress. Under the
Act, the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the intelligence agency heads must brief Congressional intelligence committees about "intelligence activities" and "any significant anticipated
intelligence activity.,,293 Additionally, a smaller group of congressional
members, the so-called "Gang of Eight,,,294 receive executive briefings
on "covert operations," when the President considers it "essential ...
to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the
United States.,,295 The arrangement becomes complicated because
congressional aides and staff members may not have the proper secu-

289. See ELSEA, supra note 281, at 1 ("The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
extent to which Congress may constrain the executive branch's power in this area. ").
290. See Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); see also FISHER, supra note 246, at
24 (arguing that Egan was based on statutory, not constitutional, framework and that Congress
has authority to legislate about scope of security clearances).
291. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 10 (1953). Moreover, Reynolds specifically dealt with executive privilege as an evidentiary doctrine, not a Constitutional requirement. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7.
292. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
293. 50 U.S.c. § 413(a)(I) (2006) (President); id. § 413a(a)(I) (Director of National Intelligence and agency heads).
294. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1053 (noting that the Gang of Eight consists of "the
chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate" and quoting Heidi Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency as Structural Directive:
A Look a the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1204 nn.252-56 and accompanying text (2007» (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. 50 U.S.c. § 413b(c)(2).
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rity clearances (controlled by the executive branch) to receive theinformation. Also, although congressional members may receive classified information, the law prohibits them from disclosing the information publicly, just as it would anyone else. 296
National security whistleblowers upset this arrangement because
they potentially circumvent these statutory procedures. They might
give classified information to congressional aides who do not have
appropriate clearance or to congressional members who do not sit on
the applicable committees entitled to the information under the Security Act. Moreover, the executive branch traditionally has controlled
when and how it conducts such security briefings, procedures undermined by an unauthorized whistle blower. National security whistleblowers run into even greater problems if they disclose classified information publicly (as opposed to Congress), because such disclosure
could subject them to employment sanctions, such as dismissal,297 to
civil penalties, and in some cases make them criminally liable under
298
statutes like the Espionage Act.
Thus, whenever Congress insisted on receiving national security
information from executive branch employees directly, without control by executive branch officials, Presidents have raised separation of
powers objections. For example, in 1996, the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) concluded that separation of powers principles prevented
Congress from providing executive branch employees a "right" to
disclose national security information to Congress or anyone else,
which in the Administration's view nullified the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act. 299 As noted in the OLC's memo on this topic,
the President's role as Commander in Chief, head of the Executive
Branch, and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations require that he have ultimate and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence and other national security information in the Executive Branch. There is no
exception to this principle for those
disseminations that would be
3
made to Congress or its members. °O

296. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After
Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1545 (2008).
297. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 5.5, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010) (stating that violating
government security regulations may result in "reprimand, suspension without pay, removal,
termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other
sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation").
298. See ELSEA, supra note 281, at 11; Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1536-37.
299. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1239-40.
300. Memorandum from Christopher H. Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael J. O'Neil, General Counsel, CIA (Nov. 26,1996), quoted in
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Congress, of course, often disagrees, as in 1997 when it passed an
Intelligence Authorization bill with a section stating that "[i]t is the
sense of Congress that Members of Congress have equal standing
with officials of the Executive Branch to receive classified information so that Congress may carry out its oversight responsibilities
under the Constitution.,,301 Other experts, such as Dr. Louis Fisher,
the Senior Specialist on Separation of Powers from the Congressional
Research Service, agree with Congress because the Constitution does
not explicitly provide for how national security information should be
regulated. 302 Instead, both Congress and the President have implied
powers related to national security, which means that they "share
constitutional authority to regulate national security information.,,303
Like his predecessors, President Obama used separation of powers arguments to justify keeping from Congress secrets related to national security. His Administration objected to congressional proposals to require the executive branch to give certain information
related to national security to the full congressional intelligence
committees, which would change the current requirement to notify
only the so-called "Gang of Eight" Congressional leaders from both
parties. 304 Moreover, Obama threatened to veto a revised proposal
that would give only generalized information to the intelligence
committees, such as informing the committees that more details were
provided to the Gang of Eight. 30S
Obama's Administration also cited separation of powers concerns when testifying to the House of Representatives about the
WPEA, which would have provided substantial new rights to national
security whistleblowers, telling the committee that, although the Administration supported whistleblower rights generally, "we must preserve the President's constitutional responsibility with regard to the
security of national security information.,,306 The provisions of the
Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1240.
30l. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-107, § 306,
111 Stat. 2248, 2252 (1997), quoted in Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1241-42 n.17; see also
FISHER, supra note 246, at 41 ("Congress has never accepted the theory that the President has
exclusive, ultimate, and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination
of national security information.").
302. S. REP. No. 105-165, at 4-5 (1998) quoted in Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1243.
303. Id.; see also Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at 153 (arguing that the constitutional powers granted to Congress and the President are "independent but concurrent efforts by the
respective branches on behalf of national security interests").
304. See Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 519.
305. See id.
306. De House Statement, supra note 195, at 3.
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WPEA that would have permitted federal employees to reveal classified information when they believed it related to wrongdoing "would
unconstitutionally restrict the ability of the President to protect from
disclosure information that would harm national security. ,,307
As a result of the heightened separation of powers concerns regarding national security, the law affecting whistleblowers who disclose problems related to national security differs dramatically from
the law for other types of whistleblowers. National security employees receive limited antiretaliation protection and may disclose only a
narrow range of wrongdoing to a restricted group of individuals. 30B
2. Limited Antiretaliation Protection
The most obvious difference between antiretaliation protection
for national security whistleblowers and other whistle blowers relates
to the coverage of the WP A. Specifically, the WPA does not protect
employees of agencies related to national security, such as the FBI,
the CIA, and the National Security Agency.309 The Act also exempts
from coverage employees who possess classified information or, even
more broadly, who work in government agencies that likely deal with
national security whether or not they handle classified information. 310
Whether they blow the whistle on national security issues or something more mundane, like gross mismanagement, these employees do
not receive the WPA-provided right to investigation by the Office of
Special Counsel and adjudication in front of the Merit Systems Protection Board, an independent agency outside of their home agency.
Moreover, even employees covered by the WPA who disclose in307. See id. at 8.
308. This section will describe generally the whistleblower provisions related to national
security. For a more detailed description of the variety of laws affecting national security whistleblowers, please refer to FISHER, supra note 246, GOODMAN, ET AL., supra note 187, Vladeck,
supra note 296, and Melissa Khemani, The Protection of National Security Whistleblowers: Imperative but Impossible: A Critical Appraisal of the Scope and Adequacy of Whistleblower Protection Laws for National Security Whistleblowers (May 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1412112>.
309. See 5 U.S.c. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) (excluding from WPA coverage "the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and, as determined by
the President, any Executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities").
310. In particular, the Act excludes employees in positions that are "excepted from the
competitive service because of its confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policyadvocating character" or "based on a determination by the President that it is necessary and
warranted by conditions of good Administration." [d. § 2303(a)(2)(B). Note that these exceptions explicitly do not include employees of the Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Energy.
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formation related to national security may not find much protection
because the WP A limits disclosures about classified information by
not protecting disclosures "specifically prohibited by law" or "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.,,311 Typically, this
means information designated as "classified" by Executive Order and
prohibited by statute from being revealed publicly.312 Employees can
make these types of disclosures only to an IG or the Office of Special
Counsel,313 or perhaps Congress if the Congressional member receiving the information sits on the appropriate committee. 314 The legislative history of the CSRA and the WP A provide some evidence that
Congress never intended to protect whistleblowers "who disclose information which is classified or prohibited by statute from disclosure. ,,315 Also, the WP A does not prohibit revocation of an employee's security clearance, which almost certainly would be revoked once
an executive branch agency discovered the employee's whistle blowing. 316 Because many jobs require a certain security clearance, revoking a clearance often equates to a dismissal and leaves the employee
with no protection from retaliation. 317
Some national security whistleblowers may receive antiretaliation protections from other statutes and regulations; however they often provide protections inferior to those provided by the WP A to
non-national security whistleblowers. For example, FBI employees
who disclose misconduce 18 to various entities within the DOt 19 may
311. See id. § 2302(b )(8)(A)
312. See Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1537 (noting that the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)
(2006), prohibits giving classified national security information "to any person not entitled to
receive it").
313. See 5 U.S.c. § 2302(b)(8)(B).
314. See id. § 2302(b )(8) ("This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee
who discloses information to the Congress.").
315. FISHER, supra note 246, at 7 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-969, at 9 (1978» (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. See Hesse v. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Egan does not address
this issue because Congress amended the Civil Service Reform Act, upon which Egan was
based, in 1989 and 1994, and the Hesse court considered whether Congress had "specifically"
addressed the security clearance issue in those amendments, finding that it did not. See id. at
1377-80.
317. See S. REP. NO. 111-101, at 34 (2009) ("The effective result of the removal of an employee's security clearance or the denial of access to classified information typically is employment termination."); ELSEA, supra note 281, at 11.
318. The types of disclosures protected by this provision mirror the WPA's protected disclosures. See 5 U.S.c. § 2303(a) (2006).
319. The disclosures must be made to the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility, thc IG, the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, the FBI Inspection Division Internal
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bring a claim through an internal administrative process if they suffer
retaliation because of the disclosure. 32o An administrative office within
DOJ conducts an investigation of reprisal claims,321 and the Director
of the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (also located
within DOJ) may conduct a hearing and award remedies if the employee demonstrates retaliation. 322 The Deputy Attorney General
may review the Director's decision, but the regulations implementing
the Act do not permit an appeal to court or even the Office of Special
Counsel. 323 Although the standards utilized under the FBI's procedures appear similar to the WP A's standards, the entirely internal
process can be problematic because of the lack of independence from
324
the process's decision makers. Moreover, the FBI provisions protect
only disclosures made within the DOJ; an FBI agent who reports
problems to Congress or the public will not receive protection from
retaliation. 325
The Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWP A)326 provides
similarly limited protections by prohibiting retaliation against members of the military for lawful communications with Congress or an
IG327 as well as for making certain, defined protected disclosures within the military hierarchy.328 As with the FBI protections, an internal
administrative process adjudicates claims of retaliation, ultimately
329
concluding with review by the Secretary of Defense. The process
remains entirely internal, and the Act also permits the Secretary of
Investigations Section, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the FBI Director
or Deputy Director, or the highest ranking official in an FBI field office. See Whistleblower Protection for Federal Bureau of Investigation Employees, 28 C.F.R. § 27.1(a) (2011).
320. Although a statute authorizes the FBI protections, see 5 U.S.C. § 2303, administrative
regulations detail the procedure and substantive remedies, see 28 C.F.R. Part 27 (2011).
321. See 28 C.F.R. § 27.3 (2011).
322. See id. § 27.4.
323. See id. § 27.5.
324. But see Valerie Caproni, Panel: The Role of Whistleblowers to Facilitate Government
Accountability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2008) (arguing that the procedures offer a "fairly
robust regulatory scheme to protect whistleblowers within the FBI").
325. See 28 C.F.R. § 27.1(a) (defining protected disclosure). While I call this process problematic, it did not trouble Valerie Caproni, the FBI's General Counsel in 2008, because "[t]here
are enough options [for disclosure] that no employee should feel he or she is in the position of
knowing horrible secrets of criminality and have no place to turn." Caproni, supra note 324, at
1245-46. Moreover, Ms. Caproni asserted that the DOJ will consider a disclosure made directly
to Congress as "protected," even though it "thwarts the statutory scheme." ld. at 1248. The regulations, however, do not appear to require this position.
326. See 10 U.S.c. § 1034 (2006).
327. See id. § 1034(b)(1)(A).
328. See id. §§ 1034(b)(1)(B); 1034(c)(2) (defining protected disclosure similarly to the
WPA).
329. See id. §§ 1034(c)-(g).

104

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 16:51

Defense to restrict IG investigations in certain intelligence and national security matters. 330 That said, the Department of Defense regulations adopt the whistleblower-friendly standards of the WP A and
also improve upon the WP A's standards in one important respect:
they permit a remedy for retaliation related to security clearances.331
Like many of the whistle blower protections detailed here, the
MWPA arose out of a separation of powers dispute. In 1954, President Eisenhower refused to permit Defense Department employees
to testify to Congress about conversations between executive branch
employees.332 The Attorney General and the DO] issued legal memoranda claiming the Constitution permits the President to withhold information from Congress in the public interest. 333 Congress complained that the President was forcing Congress to "rely upon spoonfed information from the President.,,334 Ultimately, Congress passed
the MWPA declaring that "No person may restrict any member of an
armed force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the
communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the
security of the United States,,,335 and subsequently added antiretaliation protections in 1988.336
Finally, national security whistleblowers likely have less protection under the First Amendment than other government employees.
Garcetti v. Ceballoi 37 held that the First Amendment does not protect
government employees who speak out publicly "pursuant to their official duties. ,,338 Importantly, the Court also stated that "[ r ]estricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen.,,339 Based on this statement, Professor
Stephen Vladeck and others concluded that this likely means that the
First Amendment does not protect national security employees who
disclose classified information, even if about a matter of public con-

330. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § S(b)(2) (2006).
331. Dep't of Defense 5200.2-R, Dept of Defense Personnel Security Program, Subsection
DLl.1.30.
332. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 22-23.
333. See id.
334. See id. at 23 (quoting CQ Almanac 740 (1956» (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. 70A Stat. SO (1956) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.c. § 1034 (2006».
336. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 23.
337. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
33S. Id. at 421.
339. Id. at 421-22.
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cern. 340 As Vladeck noted,
Garcetti also appears to preclude First Amendment protections for
any speech made by a government employee that would not have
been possible if he were not a government employee, even if the
speech itself is not made as part of the employee's official duties.
Where classified national security information is concerned,
the stopping point of this logic is immediately clear: National security secrets are, by definition, information to which the average private citizen does not have access. Speech related to national security secrets, then, would seem to fall squarely within the category of
speech Justice Kennedy identified
in Garcetti as falling outside the
341
First Amendment's umbrella.

Construing Garcetti more narrowly might permit a national security
whistleblower to blow the whistle as a citizen, by disclosing information to the public, such as through the media. However, Vladeck
also relied on a 2007 D.C. Circuit opinion to point out that courts will
be unlikely to uphold First Amendment protection for a disclosure
made with knowledge that "it was unlawfully obtained or leaked.,,342
Although a full analysis of Garcetti's impact on the First Amendment
rights of national security whistleblowers is beyond the scope of this
Article,343 at a minimum it would appear difficult for a national security whistle blower to claim constitutional protection for revealing classified information.
In sum, with constitutional protection questionable, retaliation
protection for national security whistleblowers depends greatly upon
the governmental agency for which one works. In the few agencies
where statutes and regulations provide some protection, they rarely
permit claims to be made outside of the employee's own agency or to
be reviewed by a third-party, such as an independent board or a
court. Moreover, the protections only extend to "lawful" disclosures
of information, which because of the nature of the classification re340. See Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1540; see also Lee, supra note 170, at 1473 (concluding
that "insiders" who leak information will have little protection from the First Amendment); Jamie Sasser, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV 759, 760 (2007) (reaching same conclusion as Vladeck).
341. Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1540.
342. See id. at 1540 n.50 (citing Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 580-81 (D.C. Cir.
2007)).
343. Whether the First Amendment would protect a national security whistleblower is a topic that deserves its own article, which others have written. See id. at 1540 (concluding that First
Amendment would not protect national security whistleblowers after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410 (2006)); see also Lee, supra note 170, at 1473 (concluding that "insiders" who leak information will have little protection from First Amendment); Sasser, supra note 340, at 760
(reaching same conclusion).
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strictions, do not permit national security whistleblowers to disclose
misconduct related to classified information to most members of
Congress or to the media.
3. Structural Disclosure Channels

To counterbalance this inferior antiretaliation protection and in
order to have some oversight over the executive branch, Congress
developed a variety of structural channels that whistleblowers can use
to disclose misconduct. These channels permit some reporting internally to other executive branch officials or entities, and in one limited
circumstance, to Congress. However, these channels neither give national security whistle blowers an unrestricted right to report to Congress nor permit them to disclose information to the general public.
The WP A provides a disclosure channel for employees to report
misconduct to the Office of Special Counse1. 344 Typically, the OSC
provides these reports to agency heads, who must then respond to the
allegations with a written report that ultimately will be sent to the
President and appropriate members of Congress. 345 The law, however,
specifically exempts reports involving foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information, if the law or an Executive Order specifically
prohibits the disclosure. 346 The OSC will send those restricted disclosures to the National Security Advisor and to Congressional intelligence committees, which ends the OSC's involvement in investigating
the disclosure. 347
In Part lILA., supra, I discussed the Inspector General Act of
1978, which provides a person within each agency to receive disclosures about the same types of information protected by the WPA: "a
violation of law, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste
of funds, abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to the
public health and safety. ,,348 After investigating, the IG must report
violations of federal criminal law to the Attorney General,349 and "serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the Administration of programs and operations of such establishment" to
the agency head, who must report them to Congress within seven

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See 5 U.S.c. § 1213 (2006).
See id. §§ 1213(c); (d); (c).
See id. § 1213(j).
See id.
See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 7(a) (2006).
See id. § 4( d).
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days.35o Congress later instituted statutory IGs for the CIA35l and the
Department of Defense. 352 In 2010, Congress implemented an overarching IG for the entire intelligence community, charged with coordinating the IGs of each individual intelligence agency as well as conducting its own investigations. 353
These various IG statutes, however, do not address some specific
issues with regard to whistleblowing by members of the intelligence
community. As with the WP A, for example, the IG Acts specifically
exclude public disclosure of any information prohibited by law, such
as classified information. 354 Moreover, although the IGs must provide
semiannual reports to Congress and publicly/55 nothing in the IG Acts
provide executive branch employees the right to go directly to Congress, or to the public generally, with concerns about misconduct. In
fact, the Act appears to permit the President or the head of an agency
to refuse to provide classified information to Congress under the
claim of executive privilege. 356 The IG Act -for the Department of Defense makes this privilege clear by placing the IG under the "authority, direction, and control" of the Secretary of Defense when the IG
engages in an investigation requiring access to information "the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to national security.,,357 Furthermore, although sound in theory, the IG system does not
completely eliminate the inherent conflict of the executive branch reviewing retaliation claims by its own employees, because a President
or an agency head actually appoints, supervises, evaluates and can fire
IGs. 358 After the initial IG Act passed, the most glaring problem with
the IG system from Congress' perspective, however, could have been
350. See id. § 5( d).
351. See 50 U.S.c. § 403q (2006).
352. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 8 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1257.
353. See The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259, §
405,124 Stat. 2654 «codified at 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h (Supp. IV 2010».
354. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 5(e)(1).
355. See id. § 5(a) (Congress); § 5(c) (public). The CIA IG must provide a classified report
to Congress. See 50 U.S.c. § 403q(d)(1).
356. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1258-59.
357. See 5 U.S.c. § 8(b)(1)(E) (2006). The Act also gives this same control when the investigation requires access to "sensitive operational plans," "intelligence matters," "counterintelligence matters," and "ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the Department of Defense related to national security." See id. §§ 8(b)(1)(A)-(D). The Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which was amended to add a statutory IG for the CIA, has a
similar provision permitting the Director of the CIA to prohibit an IG investigation when the
"prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests." 50 U.S.c. § 403q(b)(3). A
similar provision restricts the new IG for the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.c. § 4033h(f)(1).
358. See PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, supra note 31, at 7.
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that, for some reason, the intelligence agency IGs simply did not use
the "serious or flagrant" process, and Congress was not getting the information it needed from front-line intelligence agency employees. 359
To address these limitations, Congress passed the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA),360 which
provides a way for national security whistleblowers to report misconduct related to an "urgent concern." (Because the new Intelligence
61
Community IG statute contains identical provisions/ for convenience, I will refer to them collectively as the ICWP A.) These statutes
define an "urgent concern" as
(A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or
operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning
public policy matters; (B) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating
to the funding, Administration, or operation of an intelligence activity; (C) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (7)( c) in
response to an emplo~ee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this section. 02
Before reporting this urgent concern to Congress, an employee of the
intelligence community363 must disclose the information to the agency's IG or to the Intelligence Community IG. The IG must investigate
an "urgent concern" report within fourteen days, determine whether
it is credible, and if it is, give the information to the head of the agency or the Director of National Intelligence,364 who must give it to Congress within seven days.365 Importantly, the ICWPA permits the employee to report to Congress directly if the IG does not find the
employee's report credible or does not provide it to the agency head

359. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1256 n.61 (quoting a letter from Representative Porter Goss to the heads of the intelligence agencies in which Goss makes this assertion).
360. See The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §
701, 112 Stat. 2396 (199S) (containing the ICWPA, codified at 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § SH); id. § 702
(containing an identical provision applicable to the CIA and codified at 50 U.S.c. § 403q(d)(5».
361. See 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h(k)(5).
362. 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § SH(h)(l).
363. The ICWPA covers a wide variety of intelligence agencies, including the CIA, the Department of Defense, the FBI, and those designated by the President as having its principal
function conducting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 §
SH(a)(l).
364. See id. § SH(b).
365. See id. § SH(c).
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accurately.366 However, in that instance, the employee must tell the
agency head about the employee's plan to report to Congress, the
employee must follow any instruction from the agency head on how
to contact Congress "in accordance with appropriate security practices," and the employee may only give the information to Congressional intelligence committees. 367
Interestingly, these acts give the appearance of protecting from
retaliation employees who report to an IG. For example, the Inspector General Act of 1978 states that no one shall "take or threaten to
take any action against any employee as a reprisal for making a complaint or disclosing information to an IG, unless the complaint was
made or the information disclosed with the knowledge that it was
false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.,,368 Identical provisions appear in the CIA IG provision369 and in the new IG act for
the Intelligence Community.370 However, despite such prohibitions,
these Acts do not appear to permit employees to file a grievance or a
cause of action for such retaliation, which obviously limits the protections' effectiveness.
The ICWP A and the Inspectors General process differ greatly
from the whistleblower provisions available to non-security employees under the WPA. Most obviously, they do not provide any substantive protection from retaliation, which likely reduces an employee's willingness to disclose wrongdoing and therefore gives the
President almost unchecked authority to keep national security information secret from Congress. Moreover, the ICWPA only addresses misconduct that meets the definition of an "urgent concern,"
meaning that Congress likely will not hear from intelligence community employees regarding matters that, although important, do not
rise to the level of an "urgent concern.,,371 Further, under the WP A,
any covered executive branch employee can make a protected disclosure to anyone in Congress, while the disclosure options for national
security whistleblowers are much more restricted. These differences
relate specifically to the separation of powers concerns discussed
above.
For example, when negotiating the passage of the ICWP A, the
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See id. § 8H(d)(1).
ld. § 8H(d)(2).
ld. § 7(c).
See 50 U.S.C. § 403q(e)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2010).
See id. § 403-3h(g)(3)(B).
See Sasser, supra note 340, at 784.
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legislative and executive branches disagreed on whether the act
should include a "holdback provision," allowing IGs and agency
heads to keep whistle blower information from Congress in extraordinary circumstances to "protect vital law enforcement, foreign affairs,
or national security interests.,,372 Similarly to the debate in 1978 over
the IG Act,373 the Clinton Administration in 1998 asserted that the
presidential privilege required a holdback provision. 374 Congress demurred and chose to leave such extraordinary circumstances to be resolved on a case-by-case basis "through personal communication" be375
tween agency heads and congressionalleaders.
Yet, even this compromise was laced with indications that each
branch maintained its constitutional authority of either oversight, in
the case of Congress, or secrecy, in the case of the President. In its
legislative findings, Congress specified that the Constitution required
it to "serve as a check on the executive branch," with the responsibility to find out about wrongdoing in the executive branch generally
and in the intelligence community more specifically.376 It further declared that "no basis in law exists for requiring prior authorization of
disclosures" by the executive branch before an employee could report
377
misconduct to Congress. In contrast, President Clinton issued a
statement when he signed the bill noting that the" Act does not constrain my constitutional authority to review and, if appropriate, control disclosure of certain classified information to Congress .... The
Constitution vests the President with the authority to control disclosure of information when necessary for the discharge of his constitutional responsibilities.,,378 In other words, as Thomas Newcomb noted,
Congress labeled this compromise "comity," while the President la379
beled it a constitutional prerogative.
Not surprisingly, the separation of powers issue played a role
when Congress recommended the creation of an IG for all of the

372. Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1262 (quoting H.R. 3829, 105th Congo § 2(a)(E) (1998»
(internal quotation marks omitted).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 263-68.
374. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1262.
375. See id. at 1264 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-747, at 14 (1998» (internal quotation marks
omitted).
376. See Pub. L. No. 105-272, title VII, § 701(b), 112 Stat. 2413 (1998).
377. See id.
378. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999, Oct. 20, 1998, available at Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55116>.
379. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1265-67.
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combined intelligence agencies, with reporting requirements similar
to the ICWP A. Similar to President Clinton's reaction to the ICWP A,
President Obama objected to reporting requirements imposed upon
the new 10 and the Director of National Intelligence based on the
same constitutional grounds that President Clinton objected to with
the ICWP A. 380 Obama not only specifically referenced President Clinton's signing statement for the ICWPA, but also he repeated that he
did not view the disclosure requirements as mandating "disclosure of
privileged or otherwise confidential law enforcement information.,,381
The Obama Administration stated that while it supported expansion
of retaliation protections for intelligence community whistleblowers,
it also did not want any bill interpreted "to constrain the President's
constitutional authority to review and, if appropriate, control disclosure of certain classified information. ,,382 The Obama Administration
stated that it preferred to work out a compromise with Congress on
protections for intelligence community whistleblowers through the
WPEA in order to address "constitutional and other concerns. ,,383
In sum, for national security whistle blowers, the law's balance
weighs in favor of secrecy. National security whistleblowers receive
less robust protections and have fewer ways to report misconduct
than other types of whistleblowers. The distinction President Obama
and the law make among whistleblowers is based on the separation of
powers tension between oversight and transparency on the one hand
and secrecy on the other. Congress wants to encourage employees to
disclose governmental misconduct related to national security, while
Presidents want to keep vital national security information secret,
even from Congress. National security whistleblowers are caught in
this crossfire.
IV. PROVIDING A BEITER BALANCE
The contradictions and tensions of secrecy are never stronger than
in the military stance of nations.
84
Sissela Bok (1982/
380. See supra discussion accompanying notes 372-78; Barack Obama, Statement on Signing
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Oct. 7, 2010, available at Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/wsl?pid=88549> (referring specifically to President Clinton's signing statement).
381. See Obama, supra note 380.
382. See Clark, supra note 252, at 326 (2010) (quoting OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra
note 252, at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
383. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 252, at 2.
384. BOK, supra note 12, at 191.
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The answer to the second question I posed at the beginning of
the Article - does Obama's distinction make sense? - depends on
how one views the inevitable tradeoff society must make between secrecy and transparency in government. As Steven Aftergood, a prominent researcher on secrecy policy for the Federation of American
Scientists, asserted, Americans "seem to be of two minds about secrecy. ,,385 On the one hand, a democracy abhors secrecy - to govern ourselves and hold elected leaders accountable, we must have access to
information. 386 On the other hand, government needs some secrecy to
function wel1. 387 For example, the Supreme Court concluded that
some confidentiality assists a President in receiving good advice from
advisors, and the importance of such secrecy "is too plain to require
further discussion.,,388 The Court went so far as to say that this confidentiality privilege for the Chief Executive "is fundamental to the operation of Government, and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution. ,,389 Others have noted the "everdelicate balance" between transparency and secrecy,390 for as Professor Heidi Kitrosser observed, "[i]t is hardly news that secrecy has
costs and benefits. ,,391
Society seems particularly willing to accept secrecy when it relates to national security. Aftergood asserted that "there is a near
universal consensus that some measure of secrecy is justified and necessary to protect authorized national security activities, such as intelligence gathering and military operations. ,,392 Sisse1a Bok, a noted se385. Steven Aftergood, National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change, 77 SOc. RES. 839,
839 (2010).
386. See id. at 839; see also Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at 132 ("The public's 'right
to know' has always been a basic tenet of American political theory.").
387. See BOK, supra note 12, at 174 ("[G]overnment secrecy is not always an evil. Among
the many kinds of information that modern governments obtain, store, and generate, there are
some that nearly all would agree to protect from full publicity [such as] personnel files ... tentat.ive drafts circulated for discussion within an agency ... or sensitive explorations of changes in
monetary policy ... ").
388. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); see also id. ("Human experience
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.").
389. Id. at 708.
390. Sulmasy, supra note 253, at 1229.
391. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1064; see generally BOK, supra note 12.
392. See Aftergood, supra note 385, at 839; see also Ryan M. Check & Afsheen John Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA's Inspector General, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'y
247,247 (2010) ("Gathering intelligence and conducting covert action, by their nature, depend
on secrecy."); Suhnasy, supra note 253, at 1232 ("An acceptance of greater government secrecy
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crecy scholar, concluded that "every state requires a measure of secrecy in order to defend itself against enemy forces. The legitimacy of
such secrecy in self-defense is clear-cut.,,393
Indeed, in United States v. Nixon,394 although the Supreme Court
determined that a President must respond to a subpoena in a criminal
case requesting generalized information, the Court indicated the executive confidentiality privilege might require a different result if the
issue related to military or diplomatic secrets. 395 In a separate case, the
Court upheld a state secrets privilege that permitted the executive
branch to refuse to provide information in a case after showing that
"compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in
the interest of national security, should not be divulged.,,396 Professor
Kitrosser noted that secrecy's costs and benefits become amplified in
the national security context because "they often consist not only of
competing values (e.g., democratic openness versus national security)
but also of competing means of achieving the same value (e.g., national security through openness versus national security through secrecy). ,,397
Yet, even in this context, too much secrecy can occur. Bok argued that many levels of secrecy undermined the failed helicopter
rescue of the hostages in Iran in 1980, including keeping the final decision secret from those in the Carter Administration who thought it
was too risky to proceed. 398 Thus, "secrecy directed against military
opponents can also come to distort domestic choices . . . [and] can
cause reasoning and planning to go astray.,,399 More recently, the 9/11
Commission blamed excessive secrecy for leaving the country vulnerable to attack, because various government agencies' insistence on se-

is a tacit part of the decision making when any democratic nation commits to engage in armed
conflict. ").
393. BOK, supra note 12, at 191. Bok also recognized several problems with military secrecy,
arguing that "secrecy is as often a weapon in the hands of the aggressors and an aid in every
scheme of oppression." Id.
394. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
395. See id. at 710 (noting this distinction and asserting that "courts have traditionally shown
thc utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities"). The Court hinted that if the information
related to "military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets," it might not even require
the President to produce the information for a court's in camera review. See id. at 706.
396. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
397. Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1064; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Panel: Secrecy and Barriers to Open Government, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1234, 1238 (2008) ("The need for Executive
Branch secrecy is greatest when foreign policy and national security issues are implicated.").
398. See BOK, supra note 12, at 195-96.
399. Id. at 196.
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crecy led to a lack of inter-agency communication. 4oo Secrecy, even in
the intelligence community, can undermine accountability ,401 particularly the executive branch's accountability to the legislative and judicial branches. Ultimately, for example, Professor Kitrosser argued for
more transparency and less secrecy, noting that "national security
based secrecy needs are dramatically overstated" and that secrecy encourages "poorly informed and under-vetted decision-making.,,402
Inevitably, this balancing becomes context-specific. Everyone
likely understands the absolute necessity to have kept secret the operation that found Osama bin Laden in May 2011 in order to catch
him by surprise. 403 But, fewer people would support classifying documents to hide illegal or embarrassing conduct, particularly if the conduct has only a tangential relationship to national security.404 Interestingly, whistleblowing in the national security context squarely
presents the issue of how best to balance our desire for transparency
with our need for secrecy.
A. The National Security Whistleblowing Dilemma

An intelligence community employee who leaked information
about the bin Laden operation ahead of time would rightly face severe public criticism and likely criminal prosecution, while the same
employee blowing the whistle on government corruption in the FBI
might receive societal praise. 405 But, examples in the middle of these
extremes present problems. What about the whistleblower who ex400. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 417 (2004) ("Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive
compartmentation of information among agencies.").
401. Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 247.
402. Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1066.
403. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti et. al., Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2011, at AI.
404. C[. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7,75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010) (prohibiting the classification of information as secret in order to "prevent embarrassment" or to "prevent or delay
the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national security").
405. The Deep Throat source for the revelations about Nixon and the Watergate scandal
may be a good example of this latter proposition. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974); see also Susan Page & Mark Memmott,
"Deep Throat" Was Ultimate Whistleblower to Some, USA TODAY, May 31, 2005, at 4A (noting
that, although some criticized Mark Felt, who was revealed as Deep Throat, others considered
him to be the "ultimate whistleblower, a man who saw wrongdoing and exposed it at risk to his
own career"), available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-05-31-deep-throatinside_x.htm>. Notably, TIME magazine named an FBI whistleblower, Colleen Rowley, a "Person of the Year," for trying to reveal government bumbling before 9/11. See Richard Lacayo &
Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 31.
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poses a government program that is illegal but also one that effectively protects national security? Or one who publicizes wasteful military
spending, but also discloses important military intelligence in the process? Answering how best to balance secrecy and transparency to encourage the right type of whistleblowing but to discourage leaks
harmful to national security becomes extremely difficult. 406
In many ways, good reasons exist to support Obama's distinction
and treat disclosures related to national security information differently than other types of disclosures. Just as the issue of national security might make us willing to accept a higher level of governmental
secrecy,' even a whistleblower advocate might also be willing to accept
more limited antiretaliation protection for government employees
who reveal national security information. The easiest cases would involve leaks of classified information that have little to do with government misconduct. Some might not consider such leakers to be
"whistleblowers" deserving protection because, as a definitional matter, a whistleblower believes he or she is revealing illegal, unethical,
or improper misconduct in the public interest. 407 For example, the
1998 revelation in the media that the U.S. was tracking Osama bin
Laden's satellite phone arguably caused bin Laden to stop using the
phone, which of course made him harder to follow and did not reveal
408
any governmental misconduct. Similarly, the U.S. classified documents revealed to WikiLeaks provide some embarrassing and often
scandalous information, but they revealed arguably little in the way of
illegal government conduct. 409 For example, the State Department cables released by WikiLeaks revealed that Muammar Gaddafi enjoyed
the company of "four blond Ukrainian nurses" and that a U.S. diplo-

406. Cf BOK, supra note 12, at 202 (concluding that the question of whether "informed debate and government accountability" can survive in the national security context to be "the
most difficult of all those that secrecy raises").
407. See Randy Borum et aI., The Psychology of "Leaking" Sensitive Information: Implication for Homeland Security, 1 HOMELAND SEC. REV. 97, 97 (2006); Janet P. Near & Marcia P.
Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: the Case of Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1,4 (1985)
(defining whistleblowing as involving the reporting of "illegal, immoral, or illegitimate" behavior).
408. See Porter Goss, Loose Lips Sink Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2006, at A25 ("The [bin
Laden disclosure] was, without question, one of the most egregious examples of an unauthorized criminal disclosure of classified national defense information in recent years. It served no
public interest. ").
409. See Ginger Thompson, Competing Portraits in WikiLeaks Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2011, at A15 (noting that Manning's lawyers argued in court that none of the leaked information
damaged national security). But see infra text accompanying notes 425-26 (describing some arguably illegal conduct).
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mat called North Korea's former President Kim Jong Ii "flabby.,,410
Although serving no interest other than being "anti-secrecy,"
disclosures like these could damage diplomatic relationships and undermine U.S. government initiatives internationally. In addition to
petty disclosures, the State Department cables published by WikiLeaks revealed that Arab countries have requested that the U.S. attack Iran's nuclear facilities, even though those countries publicly
promote their relationship with Iran. 411 These cables did not reveal
any U.S. misconduct and could be damaging because they disclosed
behind-the-scenes communications that differ from some countries'
public stances.4!2 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that publishing the WikiLeaks' cables "puts people's lives in danger, threatens national security and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems.,,413 Such leaks may make the
government more transparent, but they hurt national security without
serving any other public interest, such as exposing misconduct.
Yet, even when whistleblowers reveal purported wrongdoing,
treating national security whistle blowing differently than other types
of whistleblowing may make sense as well. National security whistleblowers might disclose damaging information and be wrong about its
illegality because national security issues often present nuanced and
complicated problems. 414 For example, a Department of Defense employee could release classified information to a reporter about military action he incorrectly believed to be illegal, endangering people's
lives and exposing weaknesses that could be exploited by our enemies. Such disclosures cause greater harm than the typical whistle-

410. See Massimo Calabresi, The War on Secrecy, TIME, Dec. 13, 2010, at 30, available at
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0.9171.2034488.00.html> .
411. See id.
412. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512 (1980) (noting that revealing even unclassified information can harm national interests because "[i]n addition to receiving intelligence
from domestically based or controlled sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence services of friendly nations and from agents operating in foreign countries. The continued
availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the security of
information that might compromise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign
agents").
413. Calabresi, supra note 410. By contrast, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated, "Is this
embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly
modest." Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 409 (noting that Manning's lawyers argued in court
that none of the leaked information damaged national security).
414. Cf. Richard J. Barnet, 111e Ideology of the National Security State, 26 MASS. REV. 483,
495 (1985) (noting that the topic of national security is "amorphous and seemingly complex"),
quoted in Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn't Bothered?, 45 IND. L. REV. 89, 95
(2011).
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blower disclosure related to financial matters or mismanagement,
without creating any offsetting public good by revealing any actual
misconduct. 415
This ambiguity may be compounded because the dangers of the
disclosure and the legality of conduct disclosed may not be clear when
the information is disclosed. As discussed above, Jeffrey Sterling allegedly told James Risen about government waste and mismanagement in an intelligence program focused on Iran. 416 The government
asserted that Sterling's alleged leak involved the disclosure of a human asset, which "placed at risk our national security and the life of
an individual working on a classified mission," according to Assistant
Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer. 417 On the other hand, Sterling's
defenders argue that it involved information about an out-of-date
botched undercover mission that did nothing damaging except embarrass the government. 418 In fact, by the time Risen published the
book that included information allegedly from Sterling, the government was shutting down the program as a failure costing almost $100
million.419 It may be hard to judge whether and how much a leak damaged national security, even years after a leak. Protecting whistleblowers in such ambiguous circumstances may result in too many disclosures of secrets without enough exposure of wrongdoing.
Finally, assuming the employee was right about conduct being illegal, he or she might not understand the larger context for certain
government conduct. As the Supreme Court found in a related context in Snepp v. United States,420 "When a former agent relies on his
own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA - with its broader understanding of what
may expose classified information and confidential sources - could
415. See generally Lee, supra note 170, at 1466 n.62 (noting numerous government assertions
that leaks caused significant damage to national security); ct. Check & Radsan, supra note 392,
at 251-52 ("[W]hen the USDA operates ineffective programs or violates the law, the scandals
are likely to be contained within the borders of our country and the losses confined to the national treasury. By contrast, when the CIA faces problems, they are likely to implicate our national security, to affect our relations with other countries, and to put lives at risk.").
416. See supra text accompanying notes 218-23.
417. Thomas et aI., supra note 166.
418. See Greenwald, supra note 220 ("While there is no good faith claim that Risen's revelation six years after the fact harmed U.S. national security, Risen's story was unquestionably
newsworthy because it revealed how inept and ignorant American intelligence agencies are
when it comes to Iran.").
419. See Harris, supra note 226.
420. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In Snepp, the Court found that the CIA could enforce an agreement with a former employee permitting the CIA to review any of the employee's writings prior
to publication, even if the writings did not reveal classified information. See id. at 512-16.
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have identified as harmful. ,,421
Another example relates to what some have called the "mosaic
theory" to support a "state secrets" executive privilege: intelligence
may seem innocuous by itself, but will become more important when
combined with other seemingly unimportant bits of information. 422 A
whistleblower's inability or unwillingness to see the big picture may
lead to the harmful disclosure of national security information. For
example, the New York Times published WikiLeaks' Guantanamo
files on the internet one week before the raid that killed Osama bin
Laden. These files included a document from which bin Laden could
have inferred that the U.S. had learned the identity of bin Laden's
courier (and thus possibly where bin Laden was hiding), meaning that
"the house [where bin Laden was killed] could have been empty
when the SEALs arrived.,,423 Like the Supreme Court in Snepp, we
might question whether a potential whistle blower should be the person balancing the benefits of revealing the illegality against the costs
to our national security from its disclosure.
Yet, exposing illegality, government waste, gross mismanagement, and abuse of authority is just as important in the national security context as in other contexts - if not more so. The whistleblowers
who exposed the Bush Administration's domestic wire-tapping, secret
CIA renditions, and waterboarding torture methods revealed important information about arguably illegal activities and also allowed
public debate about the way in which the country fought the war on
terror. 424 Further, although WikiLeaks published numerous classified
documents revealing little in the way of illegality, the website also
published a disturbing video about an apparently illegal attack on Afghanistan civilians by a U.S. Army helicopter. 425 One commentator asserted that
many of WikiLeaks' disclosures over the last 18 months have directly involved improprieties, bad acts and even illegalities on the
part of [Secretary of State Hillary] Clinton's own State Depart421. Id. at 512.
422. See SCHOENFELD, supra note 249, at 213; Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 635 (2010).
423. Graham Allison, The Biggest Bet, TIME, May 7, 2012, at 34, 40.
424. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1052 (discussing arguments regarding legality of wiretapping); see also Isikoff, supra note 239 (discussing legality of NSA wiretaps); Shane, WikiSafe,
supra note 151, at WK1 ("All those disclosures led to public debate and to action: the prisons
were closed; coercive interrogations were banned; the N.S.A. program was brought under court
supervision. ").
425. See Shane, supra note 132 (stating that Manning was "suspected of passing a classified
video of an American military helicopter shooting Baghdad civilians").
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ment. As part of WikiLeaks' disclosures, she was caught ordering
her diplomats at the U.N. to engage in extensive espionage on other diplomats and U.N. officials; in a classified memo, she demanded
"forensic technical details about the communications systems used
by top UN officials, including passwords and personal encryption
keys used in private and commercial networks for official communications" as well as "credit card numbers, email addresses, phone,
fax and pager numbers and even frequent-flyer account numbers"
for a whole slew
426 of diplomats, actions previously condemned by the
U.S. as illega1.

The law should not permit illegal conduct to hide behind a veil of secrecy, even in the name of national security.
Additionally, just because a government official labels information as "classified" does not mean it should be classified. The government systematically over-classifies documents as "secret.,,427 For
example, in 2010, the federal government classified almost 77 million
documents, a 40 percent increase over the previous year. 428 (Government officials state this increase was due, at least in part, to better reporting by officials.t29 Steven Aftergood, the scholar on government
transparency mentioned earlier, provided a terrific example of the often-incoherent nature of government classification: as of 2002, the
government declassified the 1997 and 1998 budgets for CIA intelligence, but kept the budget total from 1947 classified. 430 Journalists
and others have argued that government officials "use classification
to hide embarrassing information about wrongdoing.,,431 Some whis426. Glenn Greenwald, Hilary Clinton and Internet Freedom, SALON (Dec. 9, 2011, 2:40 AM
CDT), <http://www.salon.com/2011112/09/hillary_c1inton_and_interneCfreedom/singleton/>; see
also Glenn Greenwald, What WikiLeaks Revealed to the World in 2010, SALON (Dec. 24, 2010,
4:25 AM CDT), <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/24/wikileaks_23/> (providing links to newspaper stories about WikiLeaks revelations concerning U.S. government misconduct).
427. See BOK, supra note 12, at 197 ("Mountains of worthless information are stamped Top
Secret; levels of secrecy multiply."); Steven Aftergood, On Leaks of National Security Secrets: A
Response to Michael Hurt, 8 NAT'L SEC. STUD. Q. 97, 97 (2002) ("A considerable quantity of
information that is not sensitive is nevertheless formally classified."); William H. Freivogel,
Publishing National Security Secrets: The Case for "Benign Indeterminacy," 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. &
POL'y 95, 99 (2009) ("[T)he government engages in a vast amount of overclassification, which
hid damaging information about the mishandling of the Vietnam War and about extensive tapping of telephone conversations without warrants."); Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 894 ("There
long has been widespread concern across the political spectrum about the existence of rampant
overclassification. ").
428. See Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A16.
429. See id.
430. See Aftergood, supra note 427, at 98 (calling such inconsistencies "capricious[)").
431. Freivogel, supra note 427, at 98. Similarly, Daniel Ellsberg has argued,
[T)he apparatus of secrecy serves in very significant part to conceal- from American voters, Congress, courts - policy errors, recklessness, violation of domestic
and international law, deception, crimes, corruption in various forms, questiona-
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tleblowers, like Daniel Ellsberg perhaps, simply act in "the public interest by exposing important, wrongly classified information.,,432
The government also can exaggerate the harm that comes from
revealing classified information. 433 For example, in the Pentagon Papers case, the government claimed that eleven specific secrets the papers revealed would harm peace talks and prolong the Vietnam War
if the New York Times published them. 434 Later, however, Solicitor
General Erwin Griswold admitted that he has "never seen any trace
of a threat to the national security from the publication" of the secrets. 435 Similarly, although President Bush claimed that the New York
Times would have "blood on their hands" if it published the domestic
wiretapping story, many have noted that the government has never
demonstrated any proof that the publication resulted in damage to
.
1securIty.
. 436
natlOna
Sometimes national security whistleblowers reveal unclassified
information, but it relates to national security and thus raises the government's sensitivities. Thomas Drake and others on his behalf asserted that he did not reveal anything related to national security se437
crets; rather, he exposed government waste and mismanagement.
ble or disastrous judgment, responsibility for catastrophes. The motivations for
classifying these are real and strong, not just a reflection of carelessness. But they
have to do with considerations of domestic and bureaucratic politics and blame
avoidance, not at all with true national security.
Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 797; see also BOK, supra note 12, at 198 ("[T]he appeal to 'national
security' offers a handy reason to avoid scrutiny of neglect, mistakes, and abuses. ").
432. See Kitrosser, supra note 414, at 118.
433. See Freivogel, supra note 427, at 95-96 ("White House and other national security officials routinely exaggerate the dangers of publishing secret information. Over the decades, government officials have presented scant proof of harm from such activities."); Wells, supra note
422, at 635 (noting that the "government's tendency to exaggerate national security harms posed
by the release of information is well-documented").
434. See Freivogel, supra note 427, at 112 (describing secrets). As Professor Freivogel noted,
These eleven secrets considered to be the most dangerous items within the Pentagon
Papers volumes involve sensitive subjects in which the government has a strong interest - diplomatic initiatives, intelligence activities, intelligence estimates and capabilities, and military contingency plans. The government claimed that disclosure of the
Pentagon Papers could endanger the lives of intelligence agents and prolong the war,
with the resulting death of thousands more soldiers and many prisoners of war.
See id. at 113.
435. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified Information,
WASIL POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25, quoted in Freivogel, supra note 427, at 113. An expert at
Daniel Ellsberg's trial buttressed this claim by asserting that "at most" 5 percent of the classified
material Ellsberg disclosed actually had potential relevance to national security when it originated, and that Y2 to 1 percent still had sufficient relevance to justify secrecy protection after two
or three years. See Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 794.
436. See Freivogel, supra note 427, at 113.
437. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 55; Greenwald, supra note 144 ("Drake's leak involved no
conceivable harm to national security, but did expose serious waste, corruption and possible
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Similarly, Franz Gayl revealed bureaucratic self-dealing and ineptitude that kept soldiers in Iraq from receiving specially armored vehicles. 438 The Marines, however, revoked his security clearance for relatively innocuous references in a public report about two internal
requests for equipment that he made while stationed in Iraq.439
In short, society's expectations regarding the relative importance
of secrecy or transparency for national security whistleblowers may
vary depending on the situation. At times it makes sense to treat national security whistleblowers less protectively than other types of
whistleblowers, but at other times we may want to provide more encouragement to them. Developing general rules and legal incentives
in this environment can be challenging because the factual circumstances involved vary from case to case.
In Part III, I concluded that the law as it stands now prefers
transparency over secrecy for most types of whistleblowers. However,
in the face of these factual uncertainties and given the potential devastating consequences for national security, the law has broadly protected secrecy at the cost of transparency and oversight with regard to
national security whistleblowers. Reforming the current system to
provide more protection for national security whistleblowers in order
to increase transparency could undermine our legitimate need for secrecy in some contexts. Yet, this conclusion assumes that we exist in a
"zero-sum" world, in which transparency gains only if secrecy loses,
and vice versa. In the next section, I question this assumption and explore whether changes to the law affecting national security whistleblowers might alter the scale to provide for more transparency, but
without negatively affecting secrecy.
B. Suggestions for Reform

Commentators have identified several different models the law
utilizes to encourage whistleblowers. 44o Currently, the law affecting
illegality.").
438. See James Verini, The Unquiet Life of franz Gayl, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Aug. 2011,
at 21, available at <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/julyaugust_2Oll/features/the_
unquiet_life_oCfranz_gayl030495.php?page=aU&print=true>.
439. See id.
440. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1151,1154 (2010) (discussing "four prototypical legal mechanisms designed to promote individual reporting: (1) Antiretaliation Protection; (2) Duty to Report; (3) Liability Fines; and (4)
Monetary Incentives"); Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 COLO. L.
REV. 975, 995 (2008) (concluding that some whistlcblowers may be protected by an employer's
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national security whistleblowers uses three of them - structural disclosure channels, antiretaliation protection, and imposing a duty to
blow the whistle - but they have flaws as applied in this context. Indeed, as I discussed above, Congress contemplated revising the law
addressing national security whistleblowers during the last several
sessions, but could not reach an agreement. 441 In this section, I broadly
outline some considerations about each of these models that may inform congressional debate going forward, with the goal of increasing
governmental transparency without sacrificing necessary secrecy.442
1. Enhanced Disclosure Channels

When balancing transparency and secrecy, we should be clear
about where those terms are directed: Transparent to whom? Secret
from whom? Transparency can mean making government decisions
more transparent to the public, which we generally desire but which
becomes problematic when juxtaposed against the need for secrecy
regarding national security. However, we could attain transparency
for national security by making executive branch decisions transparent to Congress. Such transparency assists legislative oversight, another important value balanced against secrecy. In other words, the
need for secrecy in national security affairs might generally trump
transparency to the public. However, secrecy should give way to
transparency to Congress because of its constitutional responsibility
as a check on the executive branch. 443
Problems in the national security context can become more
transparent to Congress through the use of structural disclosure
channels for whistleblowers to report misconduct directly to Congress
if the executive branch does not address it. Currently, various laws

contractual promise not to retaliate); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to
Encourage COIporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1132 (identifying a "structural
model" in which employees may utilize a disclosure channel to report misconduct) [hereinafter
Moberly, Structural Model].
441. See supra text accompanying notes 190-217.
442. I should note that at least one commentator, Professor Stephen Vladeck, believes that
the current system works well in the "vast majority of cases." Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1544.
However, Vladeck notes that the system does not work well when the highest levels of government appear to approve misconduct. See id. at 1544-46 (noting that in these cases "the likelihood that disclosure pursuant to the WPA or the ICWAP (to the extent they apply) will actually
allow for meaningful oversight of the program is fleeting, at best"). Via deck astutely points out
that, paradoxically, these are "the cases where whistleblowing is the most important - where
government employees are involved in an illegal program that has approval from the most senior officials in the relevant agencies and departments." [d. at 1544.
443. See Kitrosser, supra note 250, at 522-27; Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 916-18.
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provide national security whistleblowers ways to disclose wrongdoing
internally to an IG, who is located within the executive branch itself.444
However, Congress will find out about the report only in certain circumstances: (1) through a semi-annual report the IG sends to the
agency head, who must pass it on to Congress;445 (2) if the IG becomes
aware of "particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies," and makes a report to the agency head who must send it to
Congress;446 or (3) in response from a demand to report to Congress
an "urgent concern," if the head of an agency permits a whistleblower
to talk with Congress. 447 In other words, the law allows for an agency
head or IG to filter, and even block, reports to Congress from national security whistleblowers. 448
Although IGs theoretically provide an independent investigation
of whistleblower reports, the President may remove an IG,449 and IGs
typically act under the supervision of an agency head. As an example,
the CIA's IG reports directly to and is "under the general supervision" of the Director of the CIA.450 Moreover, the Director can prohibit the IG from conducting an investigation into wrongdoing if the
Director determines the prohibition "is necessary to protect vital national security interests. ,,451 The Director must report this type of order to Congressional intelligence committees,452 but, again, Congress
only receives secondary and filtered information about the disclosure.
The new IG position for the entire intelligence community, described above,453 resolves some of the inherent tensions of an IG investigating the IG's own agency because it would permit an investigation from someone outside of a specific agency. But, the law subjects
this overarching IG to restrictions similar to those of other IGs, in-

444. See, e.g., 50 U.S.c. § 403q (2006) (CIA 10). The Civil Service Reform Act does assert
that employees have a "right" to give information to Congress. See 5 U.S.c. § 7211 (2006).
However, that right does not attach to a remedy. The WPA provides remedies for prohibited
personnel practices like retaliation, but the WPA does not apply to most members of the intelligence community. See id. §§ 2302(a)(1) & (2)(C).
445. See, e.g., 50 U.S.c. § 403q(d)(1) (CIA 10).
446. See, e.g., id. § 403q(d)(2) (CIA 10).
447. See, e.g., id. § 403q(d)(5) (CIA 10).
448. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 440, at 1121-24 (describing blocking and filtering problems with whistleblower reports).
449. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403q(b)(6) (CIA 10). If a President removes the 10, the President
must provide the reasons for the removal to Congressional intelligence committees. See id.
450. See id. § 403q(b )(2).
451. ld. § 403q(b)(3).
452. See id. § 403q(b)(4); 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h(f)(2) (2006).
453. See supra text accompanying notes 353-70.
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cluding control by the Director of National Intelligence. 454 The Director in charge of intelligence will still control all of the investigation
and reporting to Congress. An IG may be a good first option to receive whistleblower disclosures, but the IG cannot be the only option
because an IG is inherently an internal (rather than external) check
subject to the ultimate control of the executive branch. 455 For example, IGs from intelligence agencies offered little assistance during the
warrantless surveillance controversy because they did not offer a view
on the legality of the program, could not compel testimony, and did
not receive support from key members of the Bush Administration. 456
In other cases, such as with CIA renditions and the "enhanced interrogation techniques" used against terror suspects, the press found out
about the problems before the CIA IG. 457 Two commentators explained these events by arguing that the IG's "reputation within the
Agency is so low that people risk prosecution [by leaking to the press]
rather than merely report their concerns to the authorized internal
guard.,,458 As a result, according to some, "[a]gency Inspectors General have proven themselves ineffective defenders of whistle blower
rights," suggesting that Congress require more information on IG investigations to permit enhanced legislative oversight. 459 Indeed, some
have argued that during the 1990s and 2000s, congressional oversight
of national security issues became "dysfunctional,,460 and "broken,,461
in part because excessive executive branch secrecy kept the right in. f rom gettmg
. to Congress. 462
f ormatIOn
454. See 50 U.S.c. §§ 403-3h(k); 403-3h(c); 403-3h(f).
455. See Sarah Wood Borak, The Legacy of "Deep Throat": The Disclosure Process of the
Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 617, 640 (2005) (noting that IGs are theoretically independent but they are placed in the
agencies themselves and "lack both decision-making and enforcement powers, which limits the
overall effectiveness of the disclosure process"); Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 511. Assuming this
remains the only option, Check and Radsan make a thoughtful suggestion that an IG's term
could straddle presidencies, like the Director of the FBI who is appointed for a ten-year term,
thus reducing presidential influence. See Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 292.
456. See Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 511.
457. See Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 288.
458. ld.
459. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 21. Not everyone agrees. Check and Radsan
assert that "[t]he [CIA] IG, straddled between two branches, has enough independence to do
the job." Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 292.
460. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST A'nAcKs ON THE U.S., supra note 400, at 420 ("Congressional oversight for intelligence - and counterterrorism - is now dysfunctional.").
461. DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE OVERSIGHT:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 15 (2006).
462. See id. at 27 ("First and foremost, of course, is that much of intelligence agency work
takes place under the shroud of extreme secrecy. Congressional overseers - members and staff
alike - do not know what they do not know."); Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1058-59 (detailing
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Whistleblowers can help with that information flow if their information has a more direct route to individuals who can truly investigate complaints should the IG route prove insufficient. 463 Congress
needs direct, unfiltered reports from national security whistleblowers
if the executive branch does not resolve problems identified by whistleblowers. Some may object to providing a direct line to Congress for
fear that it would compromise necessary secrecy regarding national
security matters. However, congressional members have relevant security clearances, as do many members of their staff. 464 As important,
both the House and Senate have in place procedures to handle classified information. 465 The Security Act of 1947 already contemplates
that Congress, through its intelligence committees or the "Gang of
Eight," should receive information about intelligence activities and
covert operations. 466 Thus, if the law directed whistleblowers to authorized people in Congress with a procedure set up to handle classified information, then whistle blowers could assist with transparency
about national security without a corresponding decrease in secrecy.467
The transparency would not be to the public generally, but it would
be to a separate branch of government constitutionally charged with
oversight of the executive branch. 468
Accepted theory regarding whistleblower disclosure channels also supports permitting reports to Congress. Professor Wim Vandekerckhove has set forth a "three tiered" model for disclosure, in
which a whistleblower should first report internally within an organization. 469 The whistleblower should report externally only if the interproblems with oversight even when Congress receives classified briefings).
463. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 440, at 1149-50 (describing the benefits of
Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement that corporations install a whistleblower disclosure channel permitting employees to report misconduct directly to the audit committee of the board of directors, which would bypass management blocking and filtering).
464. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1073-74, 1077.
465. See id. at 1073-75, 1080-84 (describing Congressional rules for handling classified information).
466. See 50 U.S.c. § 413(a)(1) (2006) (noting that the executive branch must keep the "congressional intelligence committees ... fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities
of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity"); id. § 413b
(providing procedures for informing Congress about covert actions).
467. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1075 ("Congress is considered to have a reliable track
record for non-leakage and it has a political incentive to avoid leaks in order to avoid blame by
the executive branch for the same. ").
468. Cf BOK, supra note 12, at 110 ("Even where persuasive reasons for collective practices
of secrecy can be stated, accountability is indispensible. ").
469. See Wim Vandekerckhove, European Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears?, in A
GLOBAL ApPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM
EXISTING WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH? 15, 18 (David Lewis ed., 2010).
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nal disclosure does not address the misconduct successfully.470 If so,
the next "tier" of disclosure would be to a regulator, "acting on behalf
of wider society.,,471 Congress serves perfectly as the outside regulator
to the executive branch because of its oversight obligations and because, to use Vandekerckhove's words, Congress has "a controlling
mandate with regard to [the executive branch], derived directly or indirectly from a political representation of society.,,472 I discuss whether
national security whistle blowers should be permitted to disclose to a
third tier - the general public - in the final section of this Part. 473
A second objection to permitting executive branch whistleblowers greater access to Congress, which is more difficult to resolve definitively, involves the current separation of powers detente described
in Part III. The issue here is not as much about secrecy as about Presidential power to determine if, when, and how the executive branch
will give information about national security to the legislative branch.
The President's constitutional prerogatives for secrecy are at their
height when national security is at stake. Although Congress has never accepted that the President's power in this field is exclusive, Con474
gress also has not shown a willingness to challenge such arguments.
It should. First, as a statutory matter, one hundred years ago,
Congress gave a "right" to federal employees to give information to
Congress, a right currently located in the Civil Service Reform Act
that applies to all employees - without an exception for intelligence
community workers. 475 Supporting that right with statutorilymandated disclosure channels would seem to fall easily within the
power of Congress. Second, as a constitutional matter, Congress has a
constitutional role in protecting national security. Professor Kitrosser
argued persuasively that the Constitution envisions a "robust struc470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

See id.
See id.
[d.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.iv.
See, e.g. S. REP. No. 111-101, at 27 (2009) (noting that in the debate over the ICWPA,

Congress agreed to modify disclosure requirements "to address the Administration's concerns"
regarding constitutional separation of powers issues); id. at 28 (stating that the Senate Committee agreed to alter provisions of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act in response to
separation of powers concerns raised by the Obama Administration).
475. See 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). The definition of "employee" that applies to all of Chapter
5 of the U.S. Code, unless otherwise indicated, does not have an intelligence community exception. See 5 U.S.c. § 2105 (2006). The exclusion for intelligence community employees comes
from the WP A, which is located in Section 2302 of Title 5 and describes "prohibited personnel
practices" for employees of only certain, non-intelligence, agencies. See 5 U.S.c. §
2302(a)(2)(C) (2006). Thus, intelligence community employees have a "right" to give information to Congress, but no remedy if the agency retaliates against them for doing so.
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tural checking" by Congress of Presidential power, in which "the executive branch can be given vast leeway to operate in secret, but remains subject to being overseen or otherwise restrained in its secrecy
by the legislature.,,476 Allowing Congress to limit Presidential secrecy
permits the balancing between constitutional norms of secrecy and
transparency required by national security whistleblowers:
On the one hand, the Constitution clearly values transparency as an
operative norm. This is evidenced by myriad factors, including the
necessities of self-government, the First Amendment, and Article
1's detailed requirements for a relatively open and dialogic legislative process. On the other hand, the Constitution reflects an understanding that secrecy sometimes is a necessary evil, evidenced both
by the congressional secrecy allowance [in Article I, section 5,
clause 3] and by the President's structural secrecy capabilities. Permitting executive branch secrecy, but requiring it to operate within
legislative parameters, themselves477open and subject to revision,
largely reconciles these two values.

Louis Fisher, who testified before Congress on this issue, made a
similar argument that "Congress has coequal duties and responsibilities for the whole of government, domestic and foreign.,,478 Moreover,
this concept is not new. In 1976, Professors Halperin and Hoffman
examined the various constitutional powers assigned to Congress and
the President and determined that they "necessarily imply independent but concurrent efforts by the respective branches on behalf of national security interests.,,479 Congress provided employees in other areas the ability to give information directly to Congress, and it should
expand that right to national security employees as wel1. 480 The constitutional arguments for presidential secrecy in the national security
arena may be persuasive when arrayed against the public's need for
transparency.481 However, when pitted against transparency to Congress to assist with its constitutional oversight responsibilities, the
476. Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 917-18.
477. ld. at 918; see also Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 522-27.
478. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, 11lth Congo 1 (2009) (statement of Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law, Law
Library of the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Fisher Statement]. available at <http://democrats.
oversighLhouse.gov/images/stories/documents/20090513183833.pdf>.
479. Halperin & Hoffman. supra note 259, at 153.
480. Moreover, part of providing a real outlet to Congress for whistleblowers also would
include requirements that national security agencies make clear how an employee or contractor
should report wrongdoing. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187. at 20 (recommending that
agencies "provide the proper guidance to their employees and contractors so they will know
how to report their complaints within the law").
481. See U.S. V. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
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President's demands for secrecy should be more circumscribed.
Will Congress do anything with more information? Professor
Kitrosser also argued that Congress does not actually want to oversee
national security issues because "congresspersons are generally best
off appearing tough and resolute, while retaining the ability to plead
ignorance should things turn out badly.,,482 Similarly, Professor Neal
Katyal asserted that Congress has abdicated its responsibility of oversight with regard to foreign affairs. 483 However, as a political matter,
more direct, unfiltered information from whistle blowers may force
Congress to assume its constitutional checking function for fear that
not doing so will have greater political ramifications should they ignore the information. As Congress receives better information, it will
be harder for it to avoid its oversight role, which can lead to better information for public debate. 484 Moreover, Congress has shown a willingness to undertake official investigations in the past that have
pushed for more transparency and served as a countermeasure to the
executive branch's tendency for over classification. 485 Further, part of
the benefit may be in the deterrent value of whistleblowing.486 Executive branch actors will know that their decision making may be scrutinized externally, which may lead to better decisions in the first in-

482. Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 484. Kitrosser also has argued that
The non-public nature of much information funneling means that "Congressional
efforts here remain largely hidden" and thus politically unhelpful to its participants. The complexity of much national security information also diminishes its
political resonance. Furthermore, the charge that information disclosure will harm
national security is easy to make and has substantial popular appeal, making it politically risky to push for disclosures. Indeed, the current [Bush] Administration
frequently makes the charge that congressional hearings on national security will
provide "the enemy" with valuable information. Fears that the executive branch
will intentionally leak national security information and blame Congress for the
leak also have been known to exist on Capitol Hill.
Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1084-85 (citations omitted).
483. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from wilhin, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2314 (2005). For Katyal, as a result of this abdication, checks and balances must be accomplished from within the executive branch itself. See
id. Among other things, he proposes an impartial decision-maker that would resolve interagency disputes, id. at 2337, an idea seemingly adopted by the government in creating the new
IG for the Intelligence Community. This enhanced internal oversight may prove to be beneficial, for as Stephen Aftergood has argued, "some of the most effective checks and balances on
government operations, including new public disclosures of formerly secret information, take
place through the process of internal oversight." Aftergood, supra note 385, at 848.
484. See Aftergood, supra note 385, at 847 ("The normal friction that accompanies congressional oversight very often serves as a driver of public disclosure.").
485. See id. (giving the Church committee investigations of intelligence activities and the 9/
11 Commission as examples).
486. See Vandekerckhove, supra note 469, at 18 ("The possibility of the second-tier being
invoked then serves as a deterrent to the organization.").
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stance. 487
2. Retaliation Protection

Structural disclosure channels help address information-flow
problems because they direct employees to a recipient who might fix
the problem identified by the whistleblower. 488 Yet, for employees to
report, the law also should address employee fears of retaliation. Although some minimal antiretaliation protection for national security
whistleblowers exists now, several flaws should be fixed to truly encourage whistleblowers and remedy any retaliation they experience. 489
Currently, as set forth in more detail in Part III.B., supra, the law
contains several prohibitions on retaliation against national security
whistleblowers, but little in the way of remedies for any retaliation.
For example, the laws creating an IG for the intelligence community
and for the CIA bar any reprisals against employees who disclose
misconduct to the IG. 490 However, the statutes do not contain any
remedy for retaliation, which leaves national security whistleblowers
without much security. Some whistleblowers may have administrative
remedies available to them, such as under the act addressing FBI
whistleblowers,491 or the Military Whistleblowers Act. 492 However,
these remedies have not worked well in practice: a recent internal
Pentagon investigation determined that the Department of Defense's
administrative procedures often failed to adequately protect military
whistleblowers. 493 Moreover, these procedures do not provide the due
process available to other federal government whistle blowers under
the WP A: hearings in front of the Merit Systems Protection Board,
487. Cf. Christina E Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REv. 903, 937-39 (2004) (describing psychological research showing that "accountability can improve judgment and decision
making").
488. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 440, at 1141-50.
489. Cf. Khemani, supra note 308, at 4 (concluding that current statutory protections "offer
little protection to national security whistleblowers due to narrow judicial interpretations, questionable impartiality of the internal review mechanisms, limited access to external disclosure
channels and review bodies, and the lack of effective remedies").
490. See 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h(g)(3)(B) (2006) (IC IG); id. § 403q(e)(3)(B).
491. See 5 U.S.c. § 2303(b) (2006); 28 C.F.R. pt. 27 (2011).
492. 10 U.S.c. §§ 1034(c)-(g) (2006).
493. See Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Def., Assessment Report: Review of the Office of
Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations, Directorate for Military Reprisal
Investigations 16 (May 16, 2011), available at <https:llwww.documentcloud.org/documents/
351491-dod-ig-internal-review-of-whistleblowing.html> (last visited June 23, 2012); see also Tom
Vanden Brook, Report: DoD Delays Endanger Whistle-blowers, USA TODAY, Feb. 22,2012,
available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-02-22Ipentagon-whistle-blowerdelays/53198210/1>.

130

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 16:51

494
with an appeal to the Federal Circuit. If a Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act passes along the lines of the bills that have been
proposed recently, many whistleblowers currently covered by the
WP A (but still excluding intelligence community whistleblowers)
would be able to bring de novo claims in federal district court if the
MSPB does not resolve their claim within 270 days.495
National security whistleblowers should be treated equivalently
to other types of federal whistleblowers regarding the substantive and
procedural remedies for retaliation. Originally, the WPA excluded intelligence agencies from its coverage "because the intelligence community handles highly classified programs and information that must
be closely guarded from public disclosure.,,496 However, the concern
that retaliation protection for national security whistleblowers would
undermine secrecy confuses two distinct concepts of antiretaliation
law: the protected disclosure and the prohibited retaliation. As an initial matter, the law could require national security whistleblowers to
maintain the secrecy of their disclosures under the rules set forth by
the classification regime. In addition, once a whistleblower makes a
protected disclosure appropriately, the law could protect the whistleblower from retaliation with a full, or slightly modified, set of remedies.
Therefore, although the disclosure itself could involve classified
material, the focus in a retaliation case would be on whether the disclosure caused retaliation - a determination unlikely to involve using
details from properly classified materials. The underlying merits of
the disclosure (i.e., whether the misconduct reported actually violated
the law, which may involve classified information) should not be litigated in a whistleblower case because retaliation law requires only a
reasonable good faith belief that the conduct was improper. 497 IGs and
494. See 5 U.S.c. § 1221 (2006) (permitting right of action to MSPB); id. § n03(b)(I)
(providing for review of MSPB decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
495. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Cong., §
117.
496. S. REP. No. 111-101, at 29 (2009); see also Fisher Statement, supra note 478, at 18 (describing Justice Department arguments that national security whistleblower legislation would
impede upon the President's right to determine who has a need to know classified information).
497. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, 11lth Congo 13 (2009) (statement of David K. Colapinto, Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr.)
("What is at issue in a retaliation case is whether an employee made a protected disclosure ...
and once that is established there is no in-depth examination of the underlying merits of the
whistleblower allegations in the retaliation case. "), available at <http://democrats.oversight.
house.goviimagesistoriesidocumentsi20090513184228.pdf>.

2012]

WHISTLERLOWERS AND THE ORAMA PRESIDENCY

131

internal processes can handle the investigation of the merits of the
disclosure separately from the issue of whether the agency retaliated
498
against the whistleblower. Courts and adjudicatory bodies would
not be involved in second-guessing executive branch decisions regarding national security - they would only determine whether the agency
retaliated against an employee for a protected disclosure.
In some cases, the employee or the agency may need to use classified material as part of the claim or defense. Accordingly, new antiretaliation provisions would have to account for maintaining the secrecy of information throughout the adjudication process. However,
such systems could be created. Administrative law judges or hearing
officers could be cleared for classified information, and evidence
could be presented under seal or redacted. Currently, Title VII claims
from intelligence community employees receive this type of treatment
to protect sensitive information because the law permits them to file
499
de novo claims for discrimination and retaliation in federal court.
Importantly, these precautions work for Title VII claims; in 1996 the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) studied such claims by intelligence community employees and determined that the claims did not
compromise national security.soo The intelligence agencies successfully
removed or redacted classified information from adverse action case
files, and the GAO determined that agencies often could litigate the
case with unclassified documents. sOl
The version of the WPEA endorsed by candidate Obama in 2007,
H.R. 985 from the llOth Congress, contained provisions that seemed
to provide the necessary balance between protecting the security of
the disclosure and providing a true remedy for retaliation. The law
would have protected national security whistleblowers who disclosed
wrongdoing to an authorized member of Congress (or a congressional
staff member with appropriate security clearance), an authorized executive branch official, or an IG. so2 Whistleblowers who felt retaliated
against could submit a complaint to the IG and the agency head, and
the IG would investigate and report to the agency head within 120

498. See id.
499. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000-e (2006); id. § 1981a.
500. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-96-6, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES:
PERSONNEL PRACTICES AT THE CIA, NSA, AND DIA COMPARED WITH THOSE OF OTHER
AGENCIES 45 (1996).
501. See id. at 38-39.
502. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985 110th Congo § lO(a).
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days.s03 The agency head would have 180 days to make a determination about whether retaliation occurred, and after that the employee
could bring a de novo claim in federal court. 504 H.R. 985 also would
have prohibited the revocation of a security clearance as retaliation,
an important additional protection not found in the current laws related to national security whistleblowing.sos Further, the bill would
have limited the ability of the executive branch to claim the "state secrets" privilege in a whistleblower case and required a report to Congress whenever the government asserted the privilege in a case. S06
The most recent iterations of the WPEA in the 112th Congress,
S. 743 and H.R. 3289, fall short of these protections. Although the
bills provide more protection from retaliation for national security
whistleblowers than currently exists, the protection is more limited
than it needs to be. For example, the bills protect national security
whistleblowers who disclose misconduct only to the Director of National Intelligence or the head of their agency.S07 This limited disclosure channel does not provide for reporting wrongdoing outside of
the intelligence community, thus avoiding any meaningful oversight
from Congress. Moreover, the bills do not provide any detail regarding how a whistleblower can enforce the antiretaliation protections.
Instead, Congress appears willing to let the executive branch provide
a regulatory scheme "consistent with" the WP A 508 that permits appeals only to a specially appointed board consisting of intelligence
community officials. s09 Moreover, the bills subject security clearance
revocations to an internal administrative review process involving the
same board. s1o Finally, the proposed laws would authorize the Direc503. See id. § 10(b).
504. See id. § 10(c).

505. The MSPB has determined that it does not have authority to review an agency determination to revoke an employee's security clearance. See Hesse v. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Obama Administration would have appeals of security clearance
revocation go to an extra-agency review process rather than federal court, and if the process
recommends reinstated the security clearance, then the law could require notification of Congress if the recommendation is not followed by the agency head. See De House Statement, supra
note 195, at 9-10.
506. H.R. 985 required a court to find in favor of an employee on an element or claim if a
"state secrets privilege" claim prevented the employee from proving the element or claim, as
long as the IG investigation substantially confirmed the element or elements of the claim. See
H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10(c) (2007).
507. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo §
201. The House bill, H.R. 3289, presents identical provisions under identical section numbers.
See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 3289, 112th Congo Title II.
508. See, e.g., S. 743, 112th Congo § 201.
509. See, e.g., id. § 204.
510. See, e.g., id. § 202.
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tor of National Intelligence to summarily fire employees and to ignore other laws prohibiting the termination of employment when
necessary for "national security.,,511
The dearth of retaliation protection currently makes any proposal for added protection sound good. Indeed, given the current limits of statutory protection when national security whistleblowers use
official channels, the system ironically encourages employees to disclose wrongdoing to the press or to sources like WikiLeaks in the
hope of remaining anonymous. If a new statute protected disclosures
deemed appropriate by the classification regime (such as to Congress,
the IG, or an agency head), then the system would encourage appropriate secrecy rather than undermine it. However, the system for protecting against retaliation does not need to be as restrictive as proposed by the bills in the 112th Congress. Permitting adjudication and
review of retaliation claims outside the intelligence community would
provide less conflicted oversight of the anti retaliation system and
likely engender more confidence among employees.
3. Whistleblowing as a Duty
Finally, the law often imposes an obligation to report wrongdoing when "the victim of misconduct is particularly vulnerable or the
harm will be widespread."s12 A wide variety of employees, from corporate officers and lawyers to supervisors of facilities that handle
hazardous materials have an obligation to disclose harmful activity if
they witness it.5!3 Experimental evidence supports emphasizing the
"duty" model to better encourage employees to blow the whistle, particularly when an employee would perceive the illegal conduct to be
reported as morally offensive. s14 Moreover, by imposing a duty to report, the law can express to all employees, and the outside world, "an
important message of the social desirability of whistle-blowing."sls
The current system imposes a duty on intelligence community
employees to blow the whistle on illegal conduct. For example, the
federal government's Code of Ethics adopted by Congress in 1958 requires all employees to "expose corruption wherever discovered" and
to "uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United
511. See, e.g., id. § 204.
512. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 440, at 1163.
513. See id. at 1163-66 (providing numerous examples).
514. See id. at 1155.
515. See id. at 1185.
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States."S16 The Standard of Conduct for executive branch employees
requires employees to "disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to
appropriate authorities.,,517 Federal government employees must take
an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United
States."S18 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these oaths can have
some power. For example, Thomas Drake asserts that the oath he
took as a federal employee influenced his decision to blow the whistle
on mismanagement and waste in the NSA. 519
Yet, these oaths might conflict with secrecy oaths and written
nondisclosure agreements required by intelligence agencies. S20 A national security whistleblower may be confronted with having to decide which oath takes precedence: the oath to expose wrongdoing and
uphold the Constitution, or the secrecy promise made when joining
the intelligence community.521 Daniel Ellsberg argued that part of the
reason government officials keep secrets about misconduct relates to
the psychology of keeping promises of confidentiality in return for being permitted to be a part of an elite, secret-keeping group.S22 The secrecy oaths and nondisclosure agreements become part of the enforcement mechanism that, according to Ellsberg, has "the same
516. See Code of Ethics for U.S. Government Service (1958), available at <http://usgovinfo.
about.com/blethics.htm>; see also Fisher Statement, supra note 478, at 2.
517. U.S. Office of Gov't Ethics, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch 2 (2009), available at <http://www.usoge.gov/Laws-and-Regulations/EmployeeStandards-of- Conduct/Standards-of-Ethical-Conduct-for- Employees-of- the-Executive-Branch(June-2009)-(PDF)/>.

518. 5 U.S.c. § 3331 (2006).
519. See Thomas Drake, Why Are We Subverting the Constitution in the Name of Security?,
WASI-!. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at A13 ("I followed all the rules for reporting such activity until it
conflicted with the primacy of my oath to defend the Constitution."); see also Vic Walter &
Krista Kjellman, NSA Whistleblower Now Silent, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2006, 4:00 PM), <http://
abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlinesl2006/07/nsa_whistleblow-2I> (reporting that Russell Tice sent a
letter to Congress revealing NSA eavesdropping and stating "It was with my oath as a U.S. intelligence officer to protect and preserve the U.S. Constitution weighing heavy on my mind that
I reported acts that I know to be unlawful and unconstitutional").
520. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 24-29 (discussing nondisclosure agreements); Jeff Stein,
CIA Director Panetta Warns Employees on Leaks, Wash. Post., Nov. 8,2010, at B3, available at
< http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/111cia_director_panetta_warns_emp .h tml>
(quoting CIA Director Leon Panetta reminding CIA officers about their "secrecy oath, which
obligates us to protect classified information while we serve at the Agency and after we leave").
521. See David Canon, Intelligence and Ethics: CIA's Covert Operations, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN
STUD. 197,201-02 (1980) (describing conflict some CIA agents felt between CIA's secrecy oath
and oath to tell the truth to Congress); Blahblog, National Security Agency Security Oath,
BLOoMOUrH (July 30, 2008), <http://blogzenze.com/blogmouth/2008/07/30/national-sec urityagency-security-oath/> ("I solemnly swear that I will not reveal to any person any information
pertaining to the classified activities of the National Security Agency, except as necessary toward the proper performance of my duties or as specifically authorized by a duly responsible
superior known to me to be authorized to receive this information.").
522. Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 777-78.
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psychosocial meaning for participants as the Mafia code of omerta.,,523
The law should be clear that exposing governmental waste,
abuse, and illegality takes precedence over any contractual obligation
to keep information secret. The versions of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act in the 112th Congress might help make this
unambiguous. The most recent bills contain provisions that require
each executive branch nondisclosure agreement to state explicitly that
the agreement incorporates and does not undermine the various whistleblower laws and regulations that affect national security whistleblowers. 524 Although these bills have other shortcomings, the provisions related to these nondisclosure agreements should be retained
and implemented. Acknowledging the priority of one's duty to report
over the duty of secrecy can reduce the conflict between these opposing obligations and make employees more willing to report misconduct. 525
Importantly, the WPEA bills also contain a requirement that
heads of agencies inform employees how they can make lawful disclosures of misconduct when the disclosure includes classified information. 526 Moreover, the bills require each IG to appoint a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate employees about
antiretaliation protections. 527 Oddly, however, the bills exclude the intelligence agencies from this requirement,528 an exclusion that should
be withdrawn in order to give all executive branch employees information about their duty to blow the whistle. Even without this requirement, some agencies have begun to provide clearer direction to
their employees regarding how to report misconduct. On October 12,
2011, the Department of Homeland Security issued a proposed ru1emaking in which DHS employees would be required to report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or corruption to "appropriate authorities
within DHS, such as the DHS Office of Inspector General, the appropriate Office of Internal Affairs, or Office of Professional Respon'b'l't ,,529
silly.
523. Id. at 780.
524. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo §§
104,115.
525. See BOK, supra note 12, at 228.
526. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo §
112.
527. See, e.g., id. § 120.
528. See, e.g., id.
529. See Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Department of
Homeland Security, 76 FED. REG. 63,206, 63,207 (proposed Oct. 12,2011).
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Any duty to blow the whistle should correspond with antiretaliation protection that applies when a whistleblower acts pursuant to this
reporting obligation. Courts have held that reporting misconduct as
part of one's job duty can eviscerate First Amendment and WP A protection from retaliation. 530 In response to these rulings, the WPEA
bills also contain provisions rejecting these courts' "job duty" exception for both WP A whistle blowers and national security whistleblowers. 531 These provisions also should be retained.
Utilizing the "duty model" can be effective, but only if the law
makes clear to national security employees that the duty to expose
misconduct takes priority over the duty of secrecy. To the extent possible, employees should not receive conflicting messages about these
dual obligations. However, the law also can make clear that disclosing
classified information as part of a whistleblower report should be accomplished in a way that protects the secrecy of the information. The
disclosure channels and antiretaliation protections mentioned above
work together with this duty to provide a multi-faceted and consistent
approach to supporting whistleblower disclosures, while also respecting the need for secrecy regarding national security matters.
4. Extreme Cases
Reforming the three models currently used to address national
security whistle blowers can greatly improve the balance between
transparency and secrecy by providing more oversight without significantly threatening important secrecy concerns. The law could funnel
disclosures to appropriate legislative and executive branch officials
without making classified information public. Moreover, the law
could remedy retaliation while still respecting important classification
concerns. Various versions of the WPEA introduced in Congress over
the last few years would improve the current system tremendously.
These improvements would encourage disclosures of low-level, or
even agency-wide, abuses because people outside the agency would
receive information about the misconduct. These recipients would,
presumably, correct the misconduct because of their oversight responsibilities.
However, what about the extreme cases involving more wide530. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (First Amendment); Huffman v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (WPA).
531. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo §§
101,202.
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spread extra-agency wrongdoing or misconduct authorized by the
President? As Professor Stephen Vladeck noted, internal whistleblowing channels like those provided by the IG Act and the ICWPA
"may not be enough when the relevant program has been approved at
the highest levels of the Executive Branch, or when there are other
reasons to doubt the impartiality of the relevant Inspector General or
the Special Counsel."S32 Moreover, disclosure to Congress only matters if Congress can do something about the disclosure publicly, which
is not always the case. 533 What if a national security whistleblower discloses classified misconduct to the appropriate congressional recipient, but nothing happens?
Vandekerckhove's three-tier model would suggest that a whistie blower should be permitted to disclose matters of public concern
directly to the public if unsuccessful with initial disclosures to the first
s34
and second tiers. Otherwise, the executive and legislative branches
would not have any accountability "to the wider society" regarding
how they address concerns being raised within the branches. 535 In fact,
the WP A currently protects disclosures of non-classified information
to the media, supporting the three-tier model. However, Vandekerckhove did not address national security issues specifically and,
as demonstrated above, such disclosures might require a different
balancing than other disclosures.
Despite those secrecy concerns, good reasons exist not to have a
wholesale prohibition on national security whistle blowing to the public. An unrestricted ban ignores the public interest side of the transparency-secrecy equation. 536 Moreover, public debate on these issues
may be more important than on any other, and sometimes leaving
oversight to Congress will not be sufficient?7
Accordingly, Professor Michael Scharf and Colin McLaughlin
suggest that retaliation protection also should be provided to whistleblowers who disclose national security information to the media under limited circumstances: if the whistleblower has a "reasonably
532. Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1535.
533. See id.
534. See Vandekerckhove, supra note 469, at 18.
535. See id.; Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at 141 (arguing that government officials
who learn about illegal conduct have an obligation to make that information public).
536. See A.J. Brown, Flying Foxes and Freedom of Speech: Statutory Recognition of Public
Whistleblowing in Australia, in WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 86, 94 (David
Lewis & Wim Vandekerckhove eds., 2011).
537. See BOK, supra note 12, at 203 ("Neither committees nor legislative groups meeting in
secret to oversee clandestine practices offer sufficient guarantees of accountability.").
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good faith belief that her allegations are accurate and that the disclosure is necessary to avoid serious harm," the whistleblower has "exhausted internal procedures unless she reasonably believes that disclosure would subject her to retaliation, or that the employer would
conceal or destroy the evidence if alerted," and the whistle blower
"publicly identifies herself as the source of the information."s38 This
suggestion has the benefits of protecting disclosures of only the most
serious harms to the public and requiring a whistle blower to utilize
the first two tiers of disclosure channels before resorting to the media
as a last option. 539 Indeed, permitting extreme cases to be disclosed to
the media (acting as a proxy for the public at large) serves as an incentive for the government to take seriously a commitment to receiving whistle blower disclosures and remedying the misconduct whistleblowers identify.540
However, the information disclosed should be more strictly defined than Scharf and McLaughlin proposed. They suggested that
"the harm in question could be physical (e.g., death, disease, or physical abuse), financial (e.g., loss of or damage to property), or psychological (e.g., invasion of privacy, or inducing terror), but lower level
harms (e.g., injustice, deception, and waste) would under most circumstances not be sufficient to meet this standard. ,,541 Although I
agree with the goal of only permitting reports to the media of truly
"serious" harms, their standard seems too loosely defined to give
much predictive value. Instead, the protections should be limited to

538. Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 579-80; see also Khemani, supra note 308, at
27 (asserting that "disclosure to the media should only be protected if it is used as a last resort").
539. Porter Goss has argued that "[t]hose who choose to bypass the law and go straight to
the press are not noble, honorable or patriotic. Nor are they whistleblowers. Instead, they are
committing a criminal act that potentially places American lives at risk." Goss, supra note 408,
at A25. However, my suggestion assumes one does not "go straight to the press" but rather has
tried to disclose the misconduct to the first two tiers available and has been unsuccessful at having the misconduct addressed.
540. Congress might need to amend the Espionage Act to clarify that it does not prohibit
the media from receiving and publishing information appropriately received from whistle blowers under any such provision. See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1000 (1973) (describing
arguments that Espionage Act could be interpreted to apply to media disclosures of classified
information); Mayer, supra note 7, at 57 (noting scholarly arguments that Espionage Act was
meant to prevent spying, not mere publication of information).
541. Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 580.
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disclosures about illegality,S42 where the public interest is the highese 43
and when the information should have been classified initially. Like
other Executive Orders related to classification, President Obama's
EO 13,526 makes clear that classification may not be used to conceal
violations of law, inefficiency, administrative error, or to prevent embarrassment to the government. 544 Limiting the disclosures to information that should not have been classified in the first place because
it covered up illegality provides an appropriately high burden for the
whistleblower (thus discouraging disclosures without sufficient public
value) while also recognizing that the classification system serves as
the distinguishing feature between national security whistleblowers
and other whistleblowers.545 If the classification system was inappropriately invoked to hide wrongdoing, then it should not prevent whistleblowers from disclosing the information to the public in order to
expose the misconduct. 546 The whistleblower should bear the burden
of proving improper classification in order to give appropriate deference to the classification process and to protecting important secrecy
concerns.
Unlike the reforms related to improved disclosure channels to
Congress, stronger antiretaliation protections, and bolder statements
about a government employee's duty to report misconduct, neither
Congress nor the President appear interested in making it easier to
disclose national security information to the media, even under the
limited circumstances suggested above. Notably, President Obama
does not stand alone politically in his quest to punish leaks of national
security information. Democratic Senator Benjamin Cardin introduced legislation to make prosecuting leakers easier by prohibiting
the disclosure of any type of classified document - currently the law
only prohibits publishing certain categories of intelligence, such as information related to communications technology or nuclear weap-

542. See BOK, supra note 12, at 130-31 (arguing that professionals with a duty of confidentiality should still breach secrecy obligations "where serious harm is likely to occur"). Similarly,
Daniel ElIsberg suggests that whistle blowers who reveal "criminal behavior" to the press should
be immune from prosecution. See Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 799.
543. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antirelalialion Principle, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 375,382 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court broadly interprets retaliation statutes
because of society'S interest "in having the law enforced").
544. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7,75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29,2009).
545. C/. Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 930 ("[J]udgments as to legal impropriety [of disclosure] should not follow automatically from the facts of classification and disclosure.").
546. (1 BOK, supra note 12, at 133 (arguing against confidentiality when used purely as "a
means for deflecting legitimate public attention").
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547
ons. The WikiLeaks disclosure of thousands of Afghanistan war
documents led to a vitriolic congressional response across the political
spectrum: two Democratic Senators scrutinized a bill that would have
provided broader protections for reporters who refused to reveal confidential sources in order to ensure that the bill would only apply to
548
"traditional" news sources and not Web sites like WikiLeaks. A
Republican Representative asked the State Department to consider
WikiLeaks a terrorist group,549 and a Democratic Senator wanted espionage charges brought against WikiLeaks' founder Julian Assan550
ge.
However, other countries have taken a different view and have
provided exemptions to laws prohibiting disclosure of state secrets if
the disclosure is in the public interest and it does not damage national
security. 55! Some countries, such as Luxembourg, require a showing
that the person who disclosed the information intended to damage
national security.552 Moldova and Georgia specifically require a balancing of the public interest against the damage to national security.553
Regardless of the approach, the law should account for unusual
or extreme circumstances in which both executive branch and congressional actors fail to act appropriately on valid whistle blower disclosures. Ultimately, in those very few circumstances when government actors seem united to hide illegal government conduct,
transparency to the public should overcome the natural presumption
of secrecy in national security matters.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the competing principles and factual varieties, can we truly
balance secrecy and transparency with the law related to national security whistle blowers? These are complex issues, and cases like
Thomas Drake should make Congress and President Obama reconsider whether the current balance skews too far toward hiding im547. See Espionage Statutes Modernization Act of 2011, S. 355, 112th Cong.; see also Benjamin, supra note 155.
548. Charlie Savage, After Afghan War Leaks, Revisions in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3,2010, at A12.
549. See Shane, supra note 151.
550. See id.
551. See DAVID BANISAR, LEGAL PROTECTIONS AND BARRIERS ON THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION, STATE SECRETS AND PROTECTION OF SOURCES IN OSCE PARTICIPATING
STATES 22 (2007) (providing examples such as Denmark and Austria).

552. See id.
553. See id.
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portant information about misconduct from Congress and the public.
Statutory whistleblower provisions either exclude national security
employees explicitly or only half-heartedly encourage them to blow
the whistle on misconduct. By erecting ineffective measures, perhaps
we have failed to address either branch's concerns because the law
neither fully encourages whistle blowers to go to Congress nor adequately maintains the secrecy that is needed for some state secrets.
Other reforms could increase transparency and address some of
the flaws in the secrecy system. With regard to the over classification
problem, the law could make it easier for employees to object to information being classified and to protect them from retaliation when
they do. 554 The Espionage Act could be amended to make prosecuting
whistleblowers more difficult by requiring the prosecution to prove
the whistleblower meant to harm national interests and by permitting
a defense that the information released was improperly classified because, for example, it was classified in order to conceal illegality or
embarrassing information. 555 Congress could provide reporters a statutory privilege not to reveal sources. 556 Legislation could limit the use
of the state secrets doctrine to avoid civil lawsuits by whistleblowers.557 Entire articles can be, and have been, written on these topics.
For now, I just note that there are many moving parts to the issue of
how best to encourage transparency and to protect needed secrecy. A
comprehensive approach does not appear forthcoming, but perhaps if
Congress and the President address the needs of national security
whistleblowers by strengthening the models described above, then
other reforms may follow.

554. Obama has taken steps to reduce the chronic overclassification problem. For example,
he established the National Declassification Center to expedite declassification decisions. See
Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 3.7, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29,2009).
555. Stephen Vladeck and others have suggested a statute specifically designed to address
leaks to the media, including a provision permitting a defendant to argue that the information
leaked should not have been classified as secret. See Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at
145 (arguing, in 1976, that the law should prohibit any criminal sanction or administrative penalty for someone who releases improperly classified information); Shane, supra note 9 (quoting
Vladeck). Currently, classification may not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency,
administrative error, or to prevent embarrassment to the government. See Exec. Order No.
13,526, § 1.7,75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
556. See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter's
Privilege in Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 688-94 (2011) (describing congressionallegislation related to a proposed reporter's privilege).
557. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 20.

